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Outsourcing is a fast-growing phenomenon. Whereas in 2000, the global outsourcing market was
estimated to be worth about $232 billion, this already amounted up to $443 billion in 2008
(Newton-Taylor 2010). Indeed, it is difficult to find an industry or a firm that does not take part
in the outsourcing trend. Yet, the popularity of outsourcing does not imply that every firm
benefits from outsourcing (Barthélemy 2003). On the contrary, as Dun and Bradstreet’s
Barometer of Global Outsourcing (2000) reports, outsourcing arrangements are characterized by
unexpected high failure rates. Within the first two years of the arrangement, almost 25 percent of
all arrangements fail, and within five years the failure rate increases up to 50 percent. Similarly,
KPMG (2007) indicates that only 42 percent of 659 surveyed firms indicated that outsourcing
had improved their performance. In the light of these findings, the major objective of this
dissertation is to get more insight into what distinguishes successful from unsuccessful
outsourcing practices.
This dissertation starts with an explanation of the concept of outsourcing and briefly
describes the history of outsourcing in §1.1. Subsequently, §1.2 provides an overview of previous
research on outsourcing. In §1.3 the major contributions are outlined. Finally, §1.4 concludes
with a short overview of this dissertation.
§1.1 What Is Outsourcing?
Every firm regularly has to decide whether it should perform a business activity in-house or
contract this activity to an external provider, which is also known as the make-or-buy decision. If
Chapter 1
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a firm chooses to contract the activity to an external provider, we say that the firm outsources this
specific activity. Thus, outsourcing can be defined as an agreement in which the outsourcing firm
delegates an activity to another company, viz. the outsourcing provider (Gilley and Rasheed
2000).
Outsourcing is not a new concept. Firms already started outsourcing in the 1970s, with a
major wave of outsourcing starting in the early 1990s (Hätönen and Eriksson 2009). However,
the nature of the functions being outsourced is changing radically. Traditionally, outsourcing was
restricted to activities like distribution and manufacturing, and support activities, like payroll
services, human resources, and information technology provision. Today, firms are increasingly
outsourcing strategic functions that are relatively more crucial to their business (Gottfredson,
Puryear, and Phillips 2005; Katz 2006), such as new product development and front-end
processes like customer support.
Firms have different reasons to outsource, of which costs, benefits, and the associated risks
are the most important considerations (Apte and Mason 1995). The top ten reasons of why firms
are outsourcing are listed in Table 1.1. As Table 1.1 shows, the primary reason for outsourcing is
to obtain cost savings (Abraham and Taylor 1996; Gilley and Rasheed 2000; Kakabadse and
Kakabadse 2002). Unfortunately, many firms do not realize that outsourcing is not just a cost-
cutting exercise and, as a result, outsourcing often does not live up to expectations (Deloitte
Consulting 2005).
Table 1.1: Top Ten Reasons to Outsource
Rank Reason
1. Reduce and control operating costs
2. Improve company focus
3. Gain access to world-class capabilities
4. Free internal resources for other purposes
5. Resources are not available internally
6. Accelerate reengineering benefits
7. Function difficult to manage/out of control
8. Make capital funds available
9. Share risks
10. Cash infusion
Source: The Outsourcing Institute, www.outsourcing.com
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§1.2 Prior Research on Outsourcing
Since outsourcing is a growing phenomenon, it is attracting increasing attention of researchers
worldwide. However, despite the growing emphasis on outsourcing, several notable gaps in the
literature remain.
Gap # 1: Functions Being Outsourced
Prior research has extensively studied the outsourcing of routine processes, like information
technology provision, distribution, and human resources (e.g., Gilley, Greer, and Rasheed 2004;
Ngwenyama and Bryson 1999; Tiwana 2008). In contrast, the outsourcing of more strategic, less
routine functions, such as customer-support activities and new product development, has received
little attention in the literature. Important exceptions in the area of customer-support outsourcing
include Ak in, de Véricourt, and Karaesmen (2008), Ren and Zhou (2008), and Bharadwaj and
Roggeveen (2008). Ak in, de Véricourt, and Karaesmen (2008) compare call-center outsourcing
contracts based on call volume and service capacity and show that the evaluation of different
contract choices should not only be based on cost considerations, but also requires a good
understanding of demand uncertainty. Ren and Zhou (2008) show which contracts (i.e.
piecemeal, pay-per-call-resolved, pay-per-call-resolved plus cost sharing, and partnership
contracts) the outsourcing firm can use such that the call center is induced to staff and exert effort
according to the outsourcing firm’s objective. Bharadwaj and Roggeveen (2008) study the impact
of outsourcing call centers on customer evaluations and find that customers are more satisfied if
(i) the call center is company-owned rather than outsourced and if (ii) the outsourcing provider is
located in the same country as the outsourcing firm. A notable exception in the area of NPD
outsourcing is Carson (2007), who investigates the relationship between the outsourcing firm’s
control and the outsourcing provider’s performance for creative tasks. Carson (2007) finds that
there are important differences between ex ante and ex post control in terms of their impact on the
performance of creative tasks. In particular, Carson (2007) shows that highly creative tasks
should be governed with more ex ante client control and less ex post control.
Gap # 2: Performance Implications of Outsourcing
As Jiang, Frazier, and Prater (2006, p. 1281) note, “in an age in which management carefully
weighs the costs and benefits of every discretionary investment dollar, finding evidence of the
Chapter 1
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results of outsourcing is critical.” Nevertheless, although academic studies have provided
valuable insights into the drivers of the outsourcing decision, surprisingly little empirical research
exists on the performance implications of this decision (Leiblein, Reuer, and Dalsace 2002).
Moreover, the scant research that has studied the performance outcomes of outsourcing is
inconclusive. Whereas some studies find a positive relationship between outsourcing and firm
performance (e.g., Jiang, Belohlav, and Young 2007), other studies report a negative relationship
(e.g., Weigelt 2009). Still others find no significant effect of outsourcing on performance (e.g.,
Gilley and Rasheed 2000). Empirical research that reconciles these inconsistent findings by
uncovering the conditions under which the performance implications of outsourcing are negative
versus positive is missing.
Gap # 3: Micro-Governance Decisions Within Outsourcing
A vast literature has focused on the question whether firms should outsource specific functions or
should vertically integrate these functions (Rothaermel, Hitt, and Jobe 2006; Ulrich and Ellison
2005). The most influential frameworks used to obtain more insight into this question are
transaction cost analysis (TCA) and the resource-based view (RBV) (McIvor 2009). The central
argument of TCA, which is built on a behavioral foundation of bounded rationality and
opportunism, is that firm boundaries are driven by the minimization of not only production costs,
but also transaction costs (Walker and Weber 1984; Williamson 1985). If transaction costs
exceed the production-cost advantage of the market, firms will favor internal organization. If
transaction costs are absent or low, economic factors will favor outsourcing (Rindfleisch and
Heide 1997).
The resource-based view regards the firm as a set of resources and capabilities that are
treated as the strengths that must be supported (Grant 1991), and that can create a competitive
advantage (Barney 1991). From the RBV, the core competences approach has evolved.
According to this approach, firms should perform core activities in-house and outsource other,
noncore activities (Prahalad and Hamel 1990; Quinn and Hilmer 1994). The RBV alerts to the
hollowing of organizations when firms are outsourcing resources and capabilities that are path-
dependent and evolve over time through learning-by-doing (Weigelt 2009).
Although these two research streams (TCA and RBV) have provided considerable insight
into firms’macro governance decisions – i.e. the ‘polar’ choice between outsourcing and vertical
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integration (Boerner and Macher 2002) – there is hardly any research on the firms’micro-
governance decisions – i.e. the governance decisions within the outsourcing governance form (a
notable exception is Poppo and Zenger 2002 in the context of information services outsourcing).
As a result, the extant literature offers little guidance regarding how firms should structure their
outsourcing arrangements, given that they are outsourcing.
§1.3 Contribution of the Dissertation
The purpose of this dissertation is to help fill the three identified gaps by answering the following
questions.
Which Functions are Good Candidates for Outsourcing?
In contrast to prior research which has mainly concentrated on outsourcing peripheral functions,
two of the chapters in this dissertation will focus on the outsourcing of relatively more strategic
functions. In particular, in chapter 2, the outsourcing of customer support will be studied.
Customer support is regarded as a core marketing strategy designed to encourage customer
satisfaction, which is essential to the long-term success of a firm as satisfied customers drive
loyalty and firm profitability (Rust, Zahorik, and Keiningham 1995; Zeithaml and Bitner 2003).
In chapter 3, the outsourcing of new product development will be studied. New product
development is core since it is a potential source of competitive advantage (Brown and
Eisenhardt 1995), and is of vital importance to the growth, profitability, and survival of firms
(Chaney, Devinney, and Winer 1991; Frambach, Prabhu, and Verhallen 2003; Sorescu, Chandy,
and Prabhu 2003; Wind and Mahajan 1997).
What Are the Performance Implications of Outsourcing?
In contrast to studying the antecedents of outsourcing, this dissertation examines the performance
implications of outsourcing. In chapters 2 and 3, the financial performance implications of
outsourcing will be studied. More specifically, shareholder value is used as a performance
metric, which is forward looking (Geyskens, Gielens, and Dekimpe 2002), less easily
manipulated by managers than other financial measures (Srinivasan and Bharadwaj 2004), and
guides the decisions of top managers (Lehmann, 2004). It reflects the investors’ best estimate of
the change in the long-term value of the firm (Gielens et al. 2008). This is especially important in
Chapter 1
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the context of outsourcing since the effects of outsourcing may take several years before fully
translating into bottom-line performance.
In chapter 4, the effects of (manufacturing) outsourcing on firm innovation will be studied.
A critical question in the context of manufacturing outsourcing is whether it makes outsourcing
firms more or less innovative. Despite decades of research on outsourcing, this debate is yet to be
resolved, an issue which is taken up in chapter 4.
How Should Firms Organize their Outsourcing Arrangements?
In contrast to previous research, which has largely focused on macro-governance decisions, this
dissertation will concentrate on micro-governance decisions. The central question in chapters 2-4
is: Given that firms have decided to outsource, how should they organize their outsourcing
arrangement to increase performance? To get more insight into this question, contingency
frameworks will be developed that specify conditions under which outsourcing will have a more
positive or a more negative effect on firm performance. In this way, we hope to demonstrate that
the inconsistent findings regarding the effects of outsourcing on firm performance in the extant
literature are a systematic and predictable set of contingent effects.
§1.4 Overview of the Dissertation
This dissertation consists of three essays. Although the essays differ in the underlying theories
and emphasis, they share the common theme of outsourcing and its implications on firm
performance. Table 1.2 provides an overview of the three essays.
Chapter 2 -- “When Does Outsourcing Customer Support Affect Firm Value?” -- concerns
the impact of outsourcing customer support on the financial performance of the firm. Customer
support is an important marketing function because it involves direct contact with end customers.
Yet, a growing number of firms are outsourcing this function, driven by the expected cost savings
that can be achieved (Juras 2008). In practice, however, many customer-support outsourcing
arrangements fall short of expectations. As indicated by Gartner (2005), 80 percent of customer-
support outsourcing projects that are aimed to cut costs fail. The purpose of this chapter is to
examine why the financial performance consequences of outsourcing customer support may
differ across firms. On the basis of three managerially relevant questions, i.e. what to outsource,
where to outsource, and how to outsource, we argue that the performance implications of
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outsourcing customer support are dependent upon the type of customer support that is being
outsourced, the institutional context surrounding the outsourcing relationship, and the
mechanisms used to govern the outsourcing agreement.
Table 1.2: General Overview of the Chapters
Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4
Research
question
How is the performance
impact of outsourcing
customer support
contingent upon the type
of customer support that




and the design of the
outsourcing arrangement?
How can firms “design”
their NPD outsourcing
deals to mitigate the
undesirable mix of
control and coordination






more firm innovation and


































Methodology Event study methodology Event study methodology Count model
Chapter 3 -- “The Market Valuation of Outsourcing New Product Development” -- is about
the financial performance implications of outsourcing new product development (NPD). New
product development is a strategic function that firms have started to outsource only recently.
Despite the increasing popularity of NPD outsourcing, many NPD outsourcing arrangements are
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not delivering the expected benefits. One of the major reasons for these disappointing results is
the presence of hidden costs (Deloitte Consulting 2005), arising from control and coordination
concerns. Control concerns pertain to the need for the outsourcing firm to protect itself against
potential opportunistic behavior by the outsourcing provider (Gulati and Singh 1998; Williamson
2008), such as provider attempts to appropriate tacit knowledge or to shirk from responsibilities.
Coordination concerns pertain to the need for the outsourcing firm to coordinate resource and
information flows with the outsourcing provider (Gulati and Singh 1998). An important question
therefore is how firms should “design” their NPD outsourcing arrangement to mitigate these
concerns and achieve positive outsourcing performance outcomes. Because numerous studies
have suggested that firms can use both formal and informal governance mechanisms as control
and coordination devices (e.g., Gulati and Singh 1998; Kumar and Seth 1998), we examine
whether and when the outsourcing firm should take a minority equity participation in the
outsourcing provider (which is a formal governance mechanism), and whether and when it should
opt for an outsourcing provider with whom it shares a history of prior ties (which is an informal
governance mechanism). Specifically, we theorize and test the effectiveness of minority equity
participation and prior tie selection under different levels of external and internal uncertainty, i.e.
technological uncertainty and cultural distance, respectively.
Chapter 4 -- “Does Outsourcing Manufacturing Enhance or Erode Firm Innovativeness?” --
deals with outsourcing manufacturing and examines the consequences of outsourcing
manufacturing on firm innovation. There is an ongoing debate in the literature about the effect of
outsourcing manufacturing on innovation. Whereas some argue that outsourcing manufacturing
inhibits innovation (e.g., Kotabe 1998; Kotabe, Mol, and Murray 2008), others suggest that
outsourcing the manufacturing function stimulates innovation (e.g., Bengtsson, Haartman, and
Dabhilkar 2009; Quinn 2000). We aim to provide more insight into the relationship between
outsourcing manufacturing and innovation by developing a contingency framework. More
specifically, we argue that the effect of outsourcing on innovation depends on demand volatility,
R&D intensity, and marketing intensity.
Chapter 5, the final chapter, summarizes the findings and provides general conclusions. In




When Does Outsourcing Customer Support Affect Firm Value?
§2.1 Introduction
Increasingly, firms are outsourcing customer support to other organizations. A recent report
indicates that of the $300 billion worldwide customer-support market in 2006, $58 billion, or
19%, was realized by outsourcing (Baird Investment Banking 2007). Baird estimates that, by
2011, outsourced services will account for just over 26% of a $400 billion global customer-
support market. Every day, there are new reports of firms jumping onto the customer-support
outsourcing bandwagon. Recent examples include Barclays, a global financial services provider
that outsources call-center jobs to India, and T-Mobile UK that outsources part of its customer
care to the Philippines.
Customer-support outsourcing particularly increases during economic downturns, when it
is embraced by companies across many industries as a popular cost-saving strategy (Juras 2008).
Yet, although customer-support outsourcing is all the rage, many outsourcing arrangements fail
to deliver the expected lower costs. Blinded by the quick-fix cost savings mainly in the area of
salaries, many firms forget that there can also be “hidden costs” of outsourcing (Ren and Zhou
2008, p. 370), such as those associated with setting up the contract or monitoring the performance
of the outsourcing provider. As a result, many customer-support outsourcing arrangements are
unsuccessful. Indeed, it has been observed that:
“50 percent of outsourcing in the near future will be successful, with the failures
stemming from clients that don’t know what they are doing, don’t understand outsourcing,
or don’t understand their own business. Therefore, they don’t know how to structure and
manage the deals.” (Deloitte Consulting 2005, p. 21)
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This lack of understanding may be attributed to the fact that there has been little systematic
academic research that investigates the impact of customer-support outsourcing on firm
performance. Against this backdrop, the goal of this research is to understand what distinguishes
successful from unsuccessful customer-support outsourcing practices.
We contribute to the literature in two ways. First, although prior research has extensively
addressed the performance implications of outsourcing routine processes such as IT and human
resources (e.g., Gilley, Greer, and Rasheed 2004; Ngwenyama and Bryson 1999; Tiwana 2008),
outsourcing of customer-support activities is relatively underresearched. The limited number of
studies that do cover the topic focus on call-center outsourcing, to the neglect of other types of
customer-support outsourcing (e.g., Hasija, Pinker, and Shumsky 2008; Ren and Zhou 2008), and
on the impact of outsourcing on customer evaluations (e.g., Bharadwaj and Roggeveen 2008).
This study will add to this literature by (1) distinguishing between customer-support services
along different dimensions, and (2) examining the financial performance consequences of
outsourcing customer support.
Second, we develop hypotheses as to why the financial performance consequences of
outsourcing customer support may differ across firms. We argue that the effects of outsourcing
customer support are contingent upon the type of customer support that is being outsourced (what
to outsource?), the institutional context surrounding the outsourcing relationship (where to
outsource?), and the mechanisms used to govern the outsourcing agreement (how to outsource?).
We hypothesize how these characteristics affect the performance implications of customer-
support outsourcing through their effect on both production costs and various transaction costs.
As to the latter, we consider safeguarding, adaptation, and performance-evaluation costs
(Williamson 1991), as well as coordination costs (Gulati and Singh 1998). By exposing the
hidden costs by which firms may fall prey to disappointment and identifying the factors that
distinguish successful from unsuccessful customer-support outsourcing practices, we hope to
assist senior executives in avoiding future costly mistakes.
We compose a database of customer-support outsourcing announcements spanning 17
countries and 21 industries. Our measure of performance impact is the stock-market reaction
around the outsourcing announcement data, which has been recognized as an important metric to
evaluate the effectiveness of marketing actions (Lehmann 2004). The results show, among others,
that the type of customer support outsourced and the institutional context surrounding the
When Does Outsourcing Customer Support Affect Firm Value?
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outsourcing relationship have important effects on firm performance. Further, the performance
consequences of outsourcing customer support are more favorable when firms use multisourcing
to govern their outsourcing relationships.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. We first outline the conceptual
framework in §2.2 and introduce our hypotheses in §2.3. Then, in §2.4, we describe the
methodology and sample. Subsequently, in §2.5, we present our results. The final section, §2.6,
discusses the study’s implications for marketing research and practice and outlines promising
avenues for future research.
§2.2 Conceptual Framework
We examine customer-support outsourcing from the transaction cost analysis (TCA) perspective.
TCA recognizes that governance decisions involve a trade-off between transaction costs and
production costs. The basic premise of TCA is that if transaction costs are high enough to exceed
the production-cost advantage of the market, firms will favor internal organization. If transaction
costs are absent or low, economic factors will favor market governance. In our context,
production costs are the costs of delivering customer support. Transaction costs are the costs
associated with the exchanges between the outsourcing firm and the outsourcing provider.
Especially the transaction costs are often overlooked or underestimated at the time outsourcing
contracts are signed (Williamson 2008). The most common forms of transaction costs are
safeguarding costs, adaptation costs, and performance-evaluation costs (Geyskens, Steenkamp,
and Kumar 2006; Rindfleisch and Heide 1997).
Safeguarding costs arise when the outsourcing firm deploys specific assets and, without
devoting time, energy, and resources to developing appropriate safeguards, faces the risk of being
opportunistically exploited by the outsourcing provider (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). Adaptation
costs occur when the relevant environmental contingencies surrounding an exchange are too
unpredictable to be specified ex ante in a contract. When environmental uncertainty increases, it
becomes progressively more difficult to write complete contracts, and costly renegotiations and
frequent contract amendments may be required as circumstances change (Geyskens, Steenkamp,
and Kumar 2006). Performance-evaluation costs arise  when  there  are  no  or  poor  measures  to
ascertain the contractual performance of the outsourcing provider. To prevent the provider from
reducing its efforts for the outsourcing firm, the firm needs to increase its selection and screening
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efforts to identify the appropriate outsourcing provider ex ante, or incur costs in the form of
monitoring and directing inputs rather than tallying up outputs and paying for performance
(Rindfleisch and Heide 1997).
While the importance of safeguarding, adaptation, and performance-evaluation costs is well
understood in TCA, the role of coordination costs has been less developed, yet may be equally
important in our context. Coordination costs stem from the administrative challenges of task
coordination as the outsourcing firm and the outsourcing provider strive to work together. They
arise from the organizational complexity of decomposing tasks and specifying a precise division
of labor among the outsourcing firm and the outsourcing provider, which requires ongoing
communication, task coordination, and joint decision making (Gulati and Singh 1998; Park and
Ungson 2001). Coordination costs are thus related to the ongoing need for mutual adaptation to
maintain a fit between the partners (Hallén, Johanson, and Seyed-Mohamed 1991), rather than
the need for adaptation to maintain a fit between the partners and the environment (which is
captured by adaptation costs) (Gulati and Singh 1998). Coordination costs result from the
interdependence between both parties in terms of coordinating tasks, which also sets them apart
from safeguarding and performance-evaluation costs which are related to competitive issues
between the exchange partners. Coordination costs can become extensive in outsourcing
relationships, especially in the case of cross-border arrangements.
We use the five costs described above (production, safeguarding, adaptation, performance-
evaluation, and coordination costs) as a framework for understanding how the performance
impact of outsourcing customer support is contingent upon the nature of customer support that is
being outsourced, the institutional context surrounding the outsourcing relationship, and the
design of the outsourcing arrangement (see Figure 2.1). We argue which particular costs are
influenced by each factor under investigation. We then “total up” these effects to make a “net”
prediction on how each characteristic should influence the performance consequences of
outsourcing customer support (for a similar approach, see e.g., Geyskens, Gielens, and Dekimpe
2002 and Fang, Palmatier, and Steenkamp 2008). Table 2.2 summarizes our approach.
When Does Outsourcing Customer Support Affect Firm Value?
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Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework
§2.3 Hypotheses
Three important questions managers should ask when outsourcing customer support are what to
outsource, where to outsource, and how to outsource (Cohen 2006).1 In order to address these
questions, we investigate the impact of (1) the nature of the customer support that is being
outsourced, (2) the institutional context surrounding the outsourcing relationship, and (3) the
mechanisms used to govern the outsourcing arrangement, on the performance implications of
customer-support outsourcing.
What to Outsource – The Nature of the Outsourced Customer-Support Service
Customer support can be classified along two dimensions: (1) the personal nature of the contact
between the outsourcing provider and the outsourcing firm’s customers, and (2) the specialized
knowledge that the outsourcing provider needs to deliver the service according to specifications
(Youngdahl and Ramaswamy 2008).
Personal customer contact. Customer contact pertains to employee-customer interaction
during the delivery of customer support (Hartline and Ferrell 1996), and can be personal or
1 Two other questions raised by Cohen (2006) – why and to whom to outsource – are not addressed in this study. The
why question is related to the antecedents of outsourcing, while this chapter focuses on the performance
consequences of outsourcing. Although it is an interesting question to which provider the outsourcing firm should
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impersonal. Customer contact is personal when it takes place through a channel that
accommodates direct, real-time interaction between the service employee and the customer. For
example, call centers involve personal contact between service employees and customers. In
contrast, e-mail support services do not involve direct, real-time interaction and are more
impersonal.
Outsourcing personal customer-support services leads to higher costs than outsourcing
impersonal customer-support services, for three reasons. First, services that involve personal
customer contact are less amenable to disaggregation (and thus to outsourcing). Specifically,
personal customer-support services have inherently smaller potential for efficiency due to the
variability that customers introduce in the creation of these services (Apte and Mason 1995).
Thus, outsourcing leads to larger production costs for customer-support services that involve
personal as opposed to impersonal customer contact.
Second, the time when the customer interacts directly with the employee is an important
evaluation moment for the customer (Bitner 1990). Employees who have direct personal contact
with customers have a larger impact on how these customers evaluate the service and, in turn, the
outsourcing firm (Hartline and Ferrell 1996). Thus, the potential for incompetent outsourcing
providers to aggravate customers’ frustration and hurt the outsourcing firm’s image is higher
when customer contact takes place through personal as opposed to impersonal channels. To
prevent this, the outsourcing firm needs to monitor the outsourcing providers’ customer-contact
employees to ensure that their behaviors are conducive to the delivery of high-quality customer
support (Hartline and Ferrell 1996). Increased monitoring, coupled with the fact that service
quality is harder to monitor in case of personal customer contact (because each service encounter
is unique and difficult to observe – Ren and Zhou 2008), leads to higher performance-evaluation
costs.
Third, when firms outsource customer-support operations that involve personal interaction
with  their  customers,  they  are  less  exposed  to  the  voice  of  the  customer,  a  valuable  source  of
market information (Karmarkar 2004). To keep track of the information provided by customers,
more intensive communication between the outsourcing firm and the provider is required, which




H1 The performance consequences of outsourcing customer support are less favorable for
firms outsourcing customer support that involves personal customer contact.
Specialized knowledge. Outsourced customer-support services may also differ in the extent
to which service providers need a high level of specialized knowledge to deliver the customer
support according to specifications (Youngdahl and Ramaswamy 2008). Customer-support
services requiring low levels of specialized knowledge are characterized by simple repeatable
routines that are easily codifiable, whereas customer-support services requiring high levels of
specialized knowledge include, at least in part, tacit procedures that are more difficult to transfer.
To provide the outsourcing provider with the required knowledge, the outsourcing firm has
to implement a training program. As the CEO of Appiant Technologies, a leading software
development company, points out: “based upon diligent training efforts to understand our product
and tech savvy workforce, we’ve engaged them [the outsourcing provider] to efficiently manage
the needs of our growing customer base” (SafeHarbor 2001). This training program will be more
intense when customer-support operations require more specialized knowledge, leading to
increased production costs.
In addition, the investments in training and educating a specific outsourcing provider
cannot be redeployed should the relationship with that outsourcing provider be terminated. As a
result, the outsourcing firm becomes increasingly “locked” into the relationship, which increases
the risk of opportunistic behavior by the outsourcing provider (Murray and Kotabe 1999), and as
a consequence safeguarding costs are increased. In sum, we hypothesize:
H2 The performance consequences of outsourcing customer support are less favorable for
firms outsourcing customer support that requires more specialized knowledge.
Where to Outsource – The Institutional Context Surrounding the Outsourcing Relationship
The institutional context surrounding the outsourcing relationship may have an important impact
on its success. Following Burgess and Steenkamp (2006), we distinguish three distinct pillars of
institutions that provide structure to society – the socioeconomic, cultural, and regulative
systems. The socioeconomic system comprises macroeconomic and demographic characteristics
(Burgess and Steenkamp 2006). The cultural system involves culturally supported beliefs,
attitudes, habits, values, norms, and behaviors (Hofstede 2001). The regulative system involves
the capacity to establish formal rules, inspect society members’ conformity to them, and if
necessary impose sanctions (Scott 2001). In this study, we include one component of each of
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these institutional pillars, namely labor-cost savings (socioeconomic; Apte and Mason 1995),
cultural distance (cultural; Hennart and Larimo 1998), and regulation (regulative; Roy and Oliver
2009).
Labor-cost savings. Often, labor-cost savings due to different salary levels between the
countries of the outsourcing firm and the outsourcing provider lie at the basis of the outsourcing
decision. For many activities, the cost of labor is the largest component (Tadelis 2007). As such,
a substantial disparity of salary levels between different countries makes outsourcing to lower
labor-cost countries an attractive alternative (Apte and Mason 1995). For example, in IT
outsourcing dramatic cost reductions of fifty to sixty percent are observed (Jain 2006). For
outsourcing non-routine activities such as customer support, cost savings can be substantial as
well. A recent report suggests that in the airline industry, a carrier with $10 billion in annual
revenues could save about ten percent a year by outsourcing customer care to lower labor-cost
locations (Daga and Kaka 2006). Assuming all skills are of equal quality, labor-cost savings
translate into lower production costs. We therefore hypothesize:
H3 The performance consequences of outsourcing customer support are more favorable when
labor-cost savings are larger.
Cultural distance. Cultural distance involves the difference between the national cultural
characteristics of the outsourcing firm’s country of origin and the country where the outsourcing
provider is located (Hennart and Larimo 1998). Intercultural differences can cause, sometimes
unintended, conflicts and distrust in inter-firm interaction (Hofstede 1997). As distrust begets
distrust  (Bradach  and  Eccles  1989),  exchange  between  firms  that  are  more  culturally  distant
involves a higher probability of opportunism, such as the outsourcing provider easing off a little
(Geis 2007). At the same time, outsourcing to more culturally distant countries makes guarding
against the outsourcing provider’s opportunistic behavior more challenging and expensive
(Hasija, Pinker, and Shumsky 2008). This entails higher safeguarding costs.
Moreover, cultural distance complicates the communication with and understanding of the
outsourcing provider (Gong et al. 2001), thereby increasing both the costs of (re-)negotiating and
the costs of coordinating activities with foreign outsourcing providers (Choi and Krause 2006).
Further, the difficulties with communication and information transfer reduce the outsourcing
firm’s ability to inspect and evaluate the outsourcing provider’s performance (e.g., financial
records and operating procedures), which increases the costs of monitoring (Lee 1998).
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Since cultural distance is expected to increase safeguarding costs (because of opportunism),
as well as adaptation, performance-evaluation, and coordination costs (because of communication
difficulties), we hypothesize:
H4 The performance consequences of outsourcing customer support are less favorable when
cultural distance between the outsourcing firm and the outsourcing provider is larger.
Regulation. The regulative system consists of rules and regulations that define what is
legally appropriate (Roy and Oliver 2009). Whereas some countries are marked by formal and
transparent rules and restrictions, others are characterized by lax regulations and laws.
When firms outsource to countries with a strong regulative system, they may face lower
transaction costs. Outsourcing providers are likely to act upon the normative influence of
regulation (Edelman and Suchman 1997) to avoid penalties for noncompliance (Hoffman 1999).
From a TCA perspective, regulation thus provides safeguards beyond those crafted in the context
of private exchange (Williamson 1999). By outsourcing to providers from more regulated
institutional environments, outsourcing firms can save on safeguarding costs, as part of these
costs will be borne by the outsourcing provider’s regulative environment. A similar argument is
made by Zerbe and McCurdy (2000, p. 14): “Some markets may be inefficient because the
government fails to enforce some agreements within that market. In such cases, government
intervention [… ] may improve the market by reducing wasteful expenditures on self-protection.”
Consistent with this TCA view on regulation as a transaction-cost reducing mechanism, we
hypothesize:
H5 The performance consequences of outsourcing customer support are more favorable when
the country of the outsourcing provider is more regulated.
How to Outsource – Choosing an Appropriate Governance Mechanism
We expect that the performance consequences of outsourcing customer support are contingent on
how outsourcing firms govern the outsourcing arrangement. Numerous studies have suggested
that firms can use both formal and informal dyadic governance mechanisms to mitigate
transaction-cost concerns (e.g., Poppo and Zenger 2002; Williamson 1991). A commonly used
formal governance mechanism in the context of customer-support outsourcing is to hold an
equity stake in the outsourcing provider (Gulati and Singh 1998; Pisano 1989).2 A frequently
2 It is important to note that the effect of equity participation is not a smooth linear effect (Kale and Puranam 2004).
Thus, the decision on equity participation is primarily a categorical (minority equity stake vs. majority equity stake
vs. equity joint venture) rather than a continuous one (Pan 1996). Following Carson (2007), outsourcing
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used informal governance mechanism is to select an outsourcing provider with whom the
outsourcing firm shares a prior relationship (Wuyts and Geyskens 2005). Much less academic
attention has been devoted to network-based governance mechanisms based on self-regulation
such as multisourcing, the practice of using multiple outsourcing providers simultaneously
(Seshadri, Chatterjee, and Lilien 1991).
Minority equity participation. An outsourcing firm may take a minority equity stake in its
outsourcing provider to create control. Control exists whenever one firm has authority or
influence over decisions made by another firm (Carson 2007; Heide and John 1990). An equity
stake typically creates control as the investing firm joins the board of directors of the outsourcing
provider that received the investment (Gulati and Singh 1998; Pisano 1989). Through the board
of directors, the outsourcing firm can monitor the outsourcing provider and better ensure that it
does not behave opportunistically. Participation on the board also provides an arena for more
easily adjusting activities as contingencies arise and for monitoring the outsourcing provider’s
performance contributions, e.g., because the outsourcing provider can be legally required to
furnish certain verified information to its investor (Gulati and Singh 1998). As such, a minority
equity stake may reduce safeguarding, adaptation, and performance-evaluation costs.
In addition, minority equity stakes may serve a role in reducing coordination costs. Board
membership creates a forum in which both partners can exchange information, jointly coordinate
activities, and ratify decisions on a regular basis, all of which reduce the outsourcing firm’s
coordination costs (Gulati and Singh 1998). In sum, the following is hypothesized:
H6 The performance consequences of outsourcing customer support are more favorable when
the outsourcing firm holds a minority equity stake in its outsourcing provider.
Prior tie selection. Prior tie selection pertains to the selection of an outsourcing provider
with whom the outsourcing firm shares a history of prior ties (Carson 2007; Heide and John
1990). Prior tie selection may affect outsourcing performance through its effects on safeguarding,
adaptation, performance-evaluation, and coordination costs.
The effect of prior tie selection on safeguarding costs is ambivalent. On the one hand, when
outsourcing firms select the same outsourcing provider over time, trust develops (Anderson and
arrangements in this study do not include equity joint ventures nor do we include arrangements where the
outsourcing firm takes a majority equity position in the outsourcing provider. Since equity joint ventures involve the
creation of new entities, they are more like hierarchies (Gulati and Singh 1998). Majority equity stakes convert an
external partner into a legal subsidiary which reflects a step from hybrid to hierarchy (Ahmadjian and Lincoln 2001).
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Weitz 1989; Gulati 1995a), which lowers the probability that the outsourcing provider will
behave opportunistically (Child and Faulkner 1998; Dyer and Singh 1998). Thus, safeguarding
costs will diminish. On the other hand, Grayson and Ambler (1999, p. 139) observe that “the
sustainable competitive advantage enjoyed by long-term relationships carries the seeds of its own
destruction.” The increased commitment to a service provider makes a client firm more
vulnerable and creates, paradoxically, opportunities for opportunistic behavior (Granovetter
1985; Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpandé 1992). Such opportunistic behavior may be subtle in
nature, such as putting less thought in new activities performed for the client firm (Moorman,
Zaltman, and Deshpandé 1992). According to this dark-side view, safeguarding costs should not
go down and may even increase.
In terms of adaptation costs, working with a familiar provider may stifle effective economic
action if economic imperatives are superseded by social aspects, such as feelings of obligation
and friendship (Uzzi 1997). Long-term relationships thus risk becoming more rigid, which can
inhibit effective adaptation to environmental contingencies and may be associated with higher
adaptation costs. In contrast, performance-evaluation costs are reduced. When the outsourcing
firm and the provider share a longer history of prior ties, the outsourcing firm is more
knowledgeable about the capabilities of the outsourcing provider (Gulati 1995b). The availability
of this historical performance benchmark makes it easier and less costly to ascertain the
outsourcing provider’s present contractual performance.
Finally, coordination costs are reduced because, by partnering over time, the outsourcing
firm and its provider (1) have learnt to better manage their relationship by aligning their interests
(Heide and John 1990), (2) have learnt to share information which better informs their actions
and decisions (Child and Faulkner 1998), and (3) have developed a set of routines that facilitates
interfirm interaction (Zollo, Reuer, and Singh 2002).
In view of these contrasting arguments, we posit alternative hypotheses:
H7a The performance consequences of outsourcing customer support are more favorable when
the outsourcing firm selects an outsourcing provider with whom it shares a prior tie.
H7b The performance consequences of outsourcing customer support are less favorable when
the outsourcing firm selects an outsourcing provider with whom it shares a prior tie.
Multisourcing. Multisourcing involves using multiple outsourcing providers to provide a
given service. A major reason why outsourcing firms use more than one outsourcing provider is
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to encourage competition among the selected providers (Seshadri, Chatterjee, and Lilien 1991;
Tullous and Utecht 1992). Competition promotes economic efficiency, which enables
outsourcing firms to receive better prices and to lower their production costs (Berger and Zeng
2006). In addition, multisourcing makes it easier to substitute one outsourcing provider for
another or to shift business between outsourcing providers (Lieberman 1991). Faced with a
credible threat of losing business to the other outsourcing providers induces each outsourcing
provider to provide high performance and to refrain from shirking (Wuyts 2007). Since the
probability of opportunistic behavior by the outsourcing providers reduces, the costs for
safeguarding against opportunistic behavior will also decrease.
Further, multisourcing helps the outsourcing firm better evaluate the outsourcing providers’
performance. Each outsourcing provider benchmarks the other: as all outsourcing providers
perform similar tasks, the outsourcing firm can directly compare their performance, which
reduces performance-evaluation costs (Richardson 1993).
Also adaptation costs are likely to be lower in the case of multisourcing. Because
multisourcing is associated with more competitive pressure, and more competitive pressure
stimulates providers to more promptly and accurately respond to new requirements (Choi and
Krause 2006; Cohen and Young 2006), contract renegotiations (when environmental
circumstances change) will become less time-consuming and less costly. Thus, multisourcing will
lower adaptation costs since any single outsourcing provider’s power over the outsourcing firm is
weakened when the outsourcing firm splits its total requirements among multiple sources (Burke,
Carillo, and Vakharia 2007).
In contrast to the aforementioned cost savings, coordination costs are likely to be higher for
multisourcing as opposed to single-sourcing. Instead of dealing with one outsourcing provider,
the outsourcing firm needs to divide project responsibilities across two or more providers. This
requires more ongoing communication and task coordination than in the case of single-sourcing
(Choi and Krause 2006; Levina and Su 2008). When we total up these effects, our net prediction
is a favorable effect of multisourcing on firm performance. This expectation of a positive net
effect is consistent with a simulation study by Richardson and Roumasset (1995), who have
shown that the inherently higher coordination costs from multisourcing can be more than offset
by cost savings in other domains.
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H8 The performance consequences of outsourcing customer support are more favorable for
firms that use multisourcing.
Control Variables
First, we control for the outsourcing firm’s size. We expect that the performance implications of
outsourcing customer support are more favorable for large firms than for small firms, because
larger firms have more bargaining power. More bargaining power provides outsourcing firms
more leverage to negotiate and renegotiate terms (Bacharach and Lawler 1981). Second, we
control for the type of industry – services vs. manufacturing – in which the outsourcing firm
operates. Because services are associated with more uncertainty due to a larger diversity and
unpredictability of customer requests (Bowen and Jones 1986), we expect that the performance
consequences of outsourcing customer support are less favorable in service industries than in
non-service industries. Third, we control for business-to-business (B2B) versus business-to-
consumer (B2C) contexts. B2B exchange is more interdependent in nature than B2C exchange
(Winer 2007). The higher need for customer alignment and mutual adjustment in B2B versus
B2C exchange may result in less favorable performance consequences when outsourcing
customer support.
§2.4 Methodology
We use an event study to examine the effect of outsourcing customer support on shareholder
value. This performance metric is forward looking (Geyskens, Gielens, and Dekimpe 2002), is
less easily manipulated by managers than other financial measures (Srinivasan and Bharadwaj
2004), and guides the decisions of top managers (Lehmann 2004).
The event-study approach relies on the assumption that financial markets are efficient.
According to the semi-strong version of the efficient-market hypothesis, a firm’s stock price
accurately reflects all publicly available information about the firm. When an event occurs (in our
case, when information concerning a firm’s outsourcing of customer support is made public),
investors update their expectations about the firm’s future performance and react by buying or
selling shares of that firm. As a result, the firm’s stock price immediately changes to reflect the
new information that arrives (Gielens et al. 2008). The percentage change in the stock price is the
stock return.
We compare the observed stock return Rit on the event day (i.e. the day firm i’s outsourcing
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arrangement was announced) with E(Rit), the firm’s return that would be expected if the event
had not taken place. The difference between the observed return for firm i on the event day and
its expected return is the abnormal return, ARit, or the firm’s unexpected change in stock price,
which is attributed to the event. The abnormal return ARit provides an unbiased estimate of the
future earnings generated by the event.
To obtain estimates of a firm’s expected returns, we use the market model. According to
this model:
mtiiit RRE βα
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 are firm-specific OLS estimates from regressing Rit on Rmt over an estimation period
from 250 to 30 trading days prior to the event.
To account for information leakage before the event day (for t1 time periods before the
event) and for the possibility that some information is disseminated after the event day (for t2
time periods after the event) (McWilliams and Siegel 1997), we aggregate the abnormal returns
for a firm over the event window [-t1, t2] into a cumulative abnormal return CARi to draw overall
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Because we conduct the event study over N outsourcing events, this CAR can be averaged into a
cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR):
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To test the significance of the CAAR, we use the Patell (1976) statistic as described in Gielens et
al. (2008). The length of the event window [-t1, t2] is an empirical issue and is determined by
selecting the most significant CAAR from several calculated CAARs for different event windows
(see, e.g., Geyskens, Gielens, and Dekimpe 2002 and Gielens et al. 2008 for similar practice).
To test our hypotheses on the performance consequences of outsourcing customer support,
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where CustConti is personal customer contact, SpecKnowi refers to specialized knowledge,
LabCosti are the labor-cost savings, CulDisi is cultural distance, Regi denotes regulation, EqParti
is minority equity participation, Tiei indicates prior tie selection, Multii refers to multisourcing,
Sizei indicates firm size, Servi refers to service industries, B2Bi represents business-to-business
outsourcing arrangements, and µi is the error term. Following Geyskens, Gielens, and Dekimpe
(2002) and Gielens et al. (2008), the CARi are standardized by the standard deviations of the
abnormal returns that were obtained for the estimation window, to reduce problems of
heteroskedasticity that may arise when the estimated variances of the market model residuals
vary across different firms. To correct for the clustering of events i in countries j,  we  use  a
random-intercept model to cope with potential differences in market sensitivity across countries
(captured by j).
Sample
Our dataset comprises customer-support outsourcing announcements during 1993-2007. We
gathered these outsourcing announcements through extensive searches in the Lexis Nexis,
Factiva, and SDC Platinum databases. This search resulted in an initial sample of 169 firms.
Elimination of firms that were not publicly traded reduced the sample to 116 firms. We further
removed eleven firms, for which stock price information was missing around the event day. To
minimize the presence of confounding effects that might have extraneous influences on stock
prices, we deleted 16 more firms for which the announcement included information about other
important firm events (e.g., firm sales, earnings, CEO appointment) or if another announcement
concerning the firm appeared within the three-day window around the announcement.
The final sample of 89 firms spans 17 different countries and 21 industries. The majority of
outsourcing firms come from the United States (39%), the United Kingdom (19%), or the
Netherlands (7%). Most outsourcing firms are active in the communications (Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) code 48), business services (SIC code 73), or industrial machinery and
equipment (SIC code 35) industries. The outsourcing providers come from a wide variety of
countries, namely Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Estonia, Germany, India, Indonesia,
Ireland, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, South
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, the U.K., and the U.S.
Operationalization
Financial measures. We obtained data on stock prices and market-wide indices from the
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Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) and Datastream databases.
Nature of the outsourced customer-support service. We content-analyzed the outsourcing
announcements, to identify whether the outsourcing arrangement involved personal customer
contact (e.g., telephone support) or not (e.g., web-based support). In a similar vein, we identified
whether the outsourcing provider required complex, specialized knowledge for delivering
customer support (e.g., technical customer support) or whether the outsourced customer-support
processes were characterized by simple, repeatable routines (e.g., reservations). Two coders
independently coded each outsourcing agreement. Inter-coder agreement was above 95%.
Differences between the coders were reconciled through in-depth discussion between the coders.
We operationalize personal customer contact as a dummy variable that equals one when the
outsourcing arrangement involves personal customer contact and zero otherwise. Similarly, we
use a dummy variable that equals one for customer support requiring specialized knowledge, and
zero otherwise.
Institutional context surrounding the outsourcing relationship. Labor-cost savings are
measured by dividing labor costs in the country of the outsourcing firm by labor costs in the
country of the outsourcing provider in the year before the announcement. Higher scores reflect
that the outsourcing firm benefits from lower labor costs in the country of the outsourcing
provider. Information on labor costs is obtained from the World Development Indicators
compiled by the Worldbank. Cultural distance is operationalized as a composite index, using the
cultural dimensions (i.e. power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity)
developed by Hofstede (2001). Cultural distance is measured as the average of squared deviations
of each of the four dimensions (variance-adjusted) between the country of the outsourcing firm
and the country of the outsourcing provider (Kogut and Singh 1988). Regulation is taken from
the Economic Freedom of the World Index (Gwartney et al. 2009). It is measured using five
indicators that reflect the extent to which price setting, administration, starting a new business,
licensing, and tax compliance in a country are regulated. Each indicator is measured on a scale
from zero to ten, with higher scores corresponding to more regulation (after reverse-coding the
original indicators). Together, these indicators measure the extent to which the business activities
in a country are regulated in the year prior to the announcement.
Governance mechanisms. The three governance mechanisms are measured using dummy
variables. The presence of a minority equity stake by the outsourcing firm in its outsourcing
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provider equals one when a minority equity stake is taken, and zero otherwise. Prior tie selection
reflects whether the outsourcing firm selected an outsourcing provider with whom it shared a tie
prior to the outsourcing arrangement (1 = prior tie selected, 0 = no prior tie selected).
Multisourcing equals one if multiple outsourcing providers are used simultaneously, and zero
when a single outsourcing provider is used to deliver the customer support.
Control variables. Firm size is measured by total sales, one year prior to the outsourcing
announcement, and log-transformed. We use a dummy variable to control for outsourcing firms
belonging to a service industry (categorized by the NAICS list). We further control for systematic
differences across B2B (1) versus B2C (0) outsourcing arrangements using a dummy variable.
Finally, to control for unobserved heterogeneity between industries, we add dummy variables for
each industry to equation (4). Since we do not a priori expect industry effects and to minimize the
number of additional effects to be estimated, we first include all relevant industry dummies and
then retain only the significant ones (cf. Anderson and Weitz 1989).
A summary description of all measures (including the diverse data sources used) can be
found in Table 2.3. Table 2.4 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations between the
covariates. Bivariate correlations exceeding .8 and variance inflation factors larger than 5 indicate
potential multicollinearity problems (Judge et al. 1988). Since correlations and variance inflation
factors are well below these critical values (highest correlation equals .48 in absolute value and
the largest VIF-value is 1.60), multicollinearity is not a concern.
§2.5 Results
Effect of Outsourcing Customer Support on Shareholder Value
Of all windows surrounding the event day, the one from 0 to +2 shows the most significant
CAAR: CAAR[0,+2] = .21% (p < .05). This implies that, on average, the customer-support
outsourcing announcement leads to an increase of .21% in shareholder value, corresponding to a
market value increase of $244.13 million in three days for an average-sized firm in our sample.
Factors Explaining Performance Differences Between Outsourcing Firms
Although the outsourcing of customer support is on average evaluated positively by the financial
markets, the performance implications of outsourcing customer support differ substantively
across outsourcing firms. Whereas 52% of the outsourcing firms show a positive CAR, 48% of
the outsourcing firms were evaluated negatively by investors. To understand this cross-sectional
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Table 2.3: Variables and Data Sources
Construct Measure Data Source
Firm performance Changes in stock prices over a three-day






Dummy variable: support service involves
personal (1) versus impersonal (0) customer
contact





Dummy variable: support service requires
complex, specialized (1) versus simple,
routine (0) knowledge
- Lexis Nexis, Factiva, &
SDC Platinum
- Company websites
Labor-cost savings Ratio of labor costs in the country of the
outsourcing firm and labor costs in the












where Idi and Idp are the scores for cultural
dimension d, outsourcing firm i, and
outsourcing provider p, respectively, and Vd
is the variance of cultural dimension d
- Hofstede (2001)
Regulation Average of five indicators reflecting the
extent to which price setting, administration,
starting a new business, licensing, and tax
regulation in a country are regulated




Dummy variable: outsourcing firm holds (1)
versus outsourcing firm does not hold (0) an
equity stake in the outsourcing provider
- Lexis Nexis, Factiva, &
SDC Platinum
- Company websites
Prior tie selection Dummy variable: outsourcing firm shares a
prior tie (1) versus outsourcing firm does
not share a prior tie (0) with the outsourcing
provider
- Lexis Nexis, Factiva, &
SDC Platinum
- Company websites
Multisourcing Dummy variable: outsourcing firm selects
multiple (1) versus a single (0) outsourcing
provider
- Lexis Nexis, Factiva, &
SDC Platinum
- Company websites




Services Dummy variable: outsourcing firm operates
in a services (1) versus manufacturing (0)
industry
- NAICS list
B2B Dummy variable: outsourcing takes place in
a B2B (1) versus B2C (0) context
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Table 2.5: Drivers of the Stock Market Reaction to Outsourcing Customer Support
Hypothesized
sign        b
a z-Value
Intercept -.57 -.63
Type of customer support
Personal customer contact - -.76* -1.58
Specialized knowledge - -.66** -1.68
Institutional context
Labor-cost savings + .01 .59
Cultural distance - -.47*** -2.34
Regulation + .19* 1.62
Governance mechanisms
Minority equity participation + -.67 -.92
Prior tie selection +/- .25 .55
Multisourcing + 1.53*** 2.61
Control variablesb
Firm size .07 .97
Services -1.33*** -2.83
B2B 1.38*** 3.10
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01
a We use one-sided tests for hypothesized effects, two-sided tests for non-hypothesized  effects.
b For simplicity of presentation, the results for the industry dummies are  not reported in the table.
variation, equation (4) is estimated. Table 2.5 presents the results.
With regard to the type of customer support that is being outsourced, we find that
outsourcing customer support that involves personal customer contact has more negative
performance implications than outsourcing customer support that does not involve personal
customer contact (b1 = -.76, p <  .10).  This  is  consistent  with  H1.  H2 proposes that outsourcing
customer support entailing specialized knowledge is evaluated more negatively by investors than
outsourcing customer support that is characterized by simple, repeatable routines. Also this
hypothesis is supported (b2 = -.66, p < .05).
H3-H5 pertain to the institutional context surrounding the outsourcing relationship. We find
that the performance implications of outsourcing customer support are unrelated to labor-cost
savings (b3 =  .01, p > .10). Therefore, H3 is  rejected.  H4 proposes that cultural distance has
negative performance implications when outsourcing customer support. This hypothesis is
supported (b4 = -.47, p < .01). Consistent with our expectations, we find that the effect of
regulation is positive and significant (b5 = .19, p < .10), supporting H5.
As to the governance mechanisms used to manage the outsourcing arrangement, holding a
minority equity stake in the outsourcing provider does not significantly improve the performance
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consequences of outsourcing customer support (b6 = -.67, p > .10). Thus, H6 is rejected. Also the
effect of prior tie selection is insignificant, rejecting H7a/b (b7 = .25, p > .10). Unlike the non-
significant effects of the dyadic governance mechanisms, the effect of multisourcing is positive
and significant, and in line with H8 (b8 = 1.53, p < .01).3
With regard to our control variables, we find no effect for firm size (b9 = .07, p >  .10).
Outsourcing firms that are active in service industries are worse off by customer-support
outsourcing than other firms (b10 = -1.33, p < .01). Finally, shareholders evaluate customer-
support outsourcing in a B2B context more favorably than customer-support outsourcing in a
B2C context (b11 = 1.38, p < .01), which contradicts our expectations. A possible explanation lies
in the observation that, even though B2B exchange is more interdependent in nature than B2C
exchange, B2B firms typically have fewer customers than B2C firms. This smaller customer base
may be better manageable for a customer-support outsourcing provider.
Robustness Checks
To check the robustness of our findings, we performed two additional analyses. First, our
measure of performance is the cumulative abnormal return over the 3-day event window [0,2].
We validated our results across an alternative window, viz. [0,1]. We chose this 2-day window
because it is the most commonly used event window to study the effect of a particular
announcement on stock prices (Hendricks and Singhal 1997). Moreover, it is at the same time
short enough to benefit from increased power of the test statistic (McWilliams and Siegel 1997),
and long enough to deal with the lack of synchronism in stock market trading hours between
countries (5-6 hours difference between American and European countries and between European
and most Asian countries; 12 hours difference between Asian and American countries; Park
2004). Overall, the results do not substantially differ from our earlier findings.
Second, to test the efficient market assumption, we checked whether the initial evaluation
was not just a short-run over- or under-reaction that was corrected in the longer-run (Fama 1998).
We calculated 3-months, 6-months, and 1-year long-term effects using the buy-and-hold
3 Since forward-looking firms may choose the governance mechanism that results in the greatest expected return
(Shaver 1998), we test for potential endogeneity in the three governance mechanisms included in our model. Relying
on TCA, we compile a set of instrumental variables to assess potential endogeneity. We include advertising intensity
and R&D intensity as proxies for asset specificity (cf. Lu and Hébert 2005). To capture uncertainty, we include
demand uncertainty (measured by regressing industry sales against time and, subsequently, dividing the standard
error of the slope coefficient of the time dummy by the average of industry sales; Boyd 1995). Finally, we include
firm age as an instrumental variable. A Hansen’s J test indicates that the equations are not overidentified (p > .10). A
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009) failed to reject the null hypothesis that the governance
mechanism variables are exogenous (p > .10).
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abnormal returns (BHAR) and Ibbotson’s returns across time and securities (IRATS) models. We
find no effect on long-term abnormal returns (p’s > .05), suggesting that the stock market is
reasonably efficient. Thus, the abnormal returns to outsourcing customer support occur in the
short-term window and there are no corrections in the long-run.4
§2.6 Discussion
Outsourcing customer support is a huge trend that organizations can no longer ignore (Alster
2005). Yet, many customer-support outsourcing projects are unsuccessful. We find that the
financial markets evaluate 52% of the customer-support outsourcing announcements positively,
whereas 48% is evaluated negatively. Drawing on transaction cost analysis, we identify a number
of factors that distinguish successful from unsuccessful customer-support outsourcing practices.
We demonstrate that the decision to outsource customer support should involve far more than
labor-cost savings due to differences in salary levels between the countries of the outsourcing
firm and the outsourcing provider. Hidden costs arising from the type of customer support that is
being outsourced, the cultural and regulative institutional context surrounding the outsourcing
relationship, and the mechanisms used to govern the outsourcing arrangement play a far more
important role.
Several interesting insights and managerial implications emerge from our findings. First,
the nature of the outsourced customer-support service should be taken into account. Outsourcing
customer support that requires direct, real-time interaction between the customer and the service
employee negatively affects the outsourcing firm’s performance. Employees who have direct
personal contact with customers heavily influence customers’ perceptions about service quality,
positively as well as negatively (Hartline and Ferrell 1996). To prevent the negative effects from
materializing, the outsourcing provider needs to be monitored to ensure that its behaviors are
conducive to the delivery of high-quality customer support. In addition, when firms outsource
customer-support functions that involve direct customer contact, they lose sight of some of the
most valuable market information, unless they extensively coordinate with the outsourcing
4 Our dependent variable is the short-term cumulative abnormal return accruing from the outsourcing announcement
to the outsourcing firm. Although this measure materializes in the short term (consistent with the efficient market
hypothesis that a firm’s stock price immediately reflects all new information), conceptually this measure reflects the
stock markets’best estimate of the change in the long-term value of the firm. Significant long-term abnormal returns,
as computed by the BHAR or IRATS methodology, reflect that the stock market is not efficient, but rather over- or
under-reacted to the announcement. They do not connote long-term firm performance.
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provider to feed the customer information back into the organization. This may further increase
costs and reduce performance.
Outsourcing customer support that requires specialized knowledge also negatively affects
performance. The intensive training needed to get the outsourcing provider started is costly.
Moreover, the training investments made in the outsourcing provider cannot be redeployed in
case the relation with the outsourcing provider is terminated. This creates an incentive for the
outsourcing provider to behave opportunistically, which increases safeguarding costs. From a
researcher’s perspective, these results show that, to fully understand the performance implications
of customer-support outsourcing, we should acknowledge differences between – rather than
generalize across – customer-support services.
Interestingly, our findings question the appropriateness of narrowing down the outsourcing
debate to a discussion on labor costs, a discourse that is common in the popular press. We find
that labor-cost savings resulting from outsourcing do not influence the market valuation of
outsourcing firms. However, the cultural and regulatory institutional contexts surrounding the
outsourcing arrangement do. Thus, although labor-cost savings too often are managers’ primary
consideration in outsourcing decisions (Deloitte Consulting 2005; Juras 2008; Whitaker,
Krishnan, and Fornell 2008), shareholders recognize the hidden costs that may arise from the
cultural and regulative context of the outsourcing arrangement. The performance implications of
customer-support outsourcing are less favorable when firms outsource to culturally distant
countries or countries with a weak regulatory system. Our finding that cultural distance is an
important driver of performance is in line with Flores and Aguilera (2007), who show that there
is a continued need for learning across cultures (despite the fact that countries seemingly become
more homogenous due to globalization).
We further find that dyadic mechanisms to govern an outsourcing agreement, in particular
minority equity participation and prior tie selection, do not affect the performance consequences
of outsourcing customer support. On the one hand, we expected a minority equity stake to reduce
transaction costs. Our lack of empirical support may indicate that these transaction cost
advantages are neutralized by the cost of equity participation itself. On the other hand, the
opposite effects of prior tie selection on the various types of transaction costs (see Table 2.2) may
have canceled each other out, resulting in an insignificant net effect of prior tie selection on
performance.
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In contrast, the performance consequences of customer-support outsourcing are much more
favorable when firms use multisourcing to govern the outsourcing relationship, a finding that
justifies the recent trend of selecting multiple outsourcing providers to provide a given service
(Levina and Su 2008). Multisourcing reduces the outsourcing firm’s dependence on a single
outsourcing provider and introduces competition that stimulates best practice among outsourcing
providers. Even though governance mechanisms where dependency on one actor is reduced by
building ties to competing actors go back more than a century in the academic literature (see the
discussion on the tertius gaudens principle in Simmel 1950 [1908]), such network control
mechanisms have received only scant attention in the marketing literature. A recent finding that
competing suppliers are willing to go beyond the call of duty and engage in behaviors not
formally required (Wuyts 2007), underscores the self-regulating nature of this governance
mechanism. Our findings regarding multisourcing, minority equity participation, and prior tie
selection complement these insights and will hopefully stimulate more research into
multisourcing and other network governance mechanisms as alternatives to dyadic governance
mechanisms.
Limitations and Future Research Directions
This study has several limitations that offer interesting avenues for future research. A first
limitation of this study is intrinsic to the secondary nature of the data. Despite the diverse data
sources used for composing the database, transaction costs remain notoriously difficult to
measure. Therefore, only qualitative statements could be made about the effects of outsourcing
customer support on safeguarding, adaptation, performance-evaluation, or coordination costs.
Future survey research could assess the performance effects of outsourcing customer support on
each of these costs separately. Second, a question that remains unanswered in this study is whom
the outsourcing firm should select as outsourcing provider. Although we investigate factors
related to the outsourcing provider’s country, characteristics of the outsourcing provider such as
its reputation are left to future research.
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Chapter 3
The Market Valuation of Outsourcing New Product Development
§3.1 Introduction
Firms have long outsourced some of the activities previously performed in-house to independent,
outside firms. What began as the outsourcing of peripheral functions such as data entry or payroll
processing, has evolved into the outsourcing of more strategic activities like new product
development (NPD). Nokia, for example, outsources NPD activities to the Finnish firm
TietoEnator. Novo Nordisk, a Danish pharmaceutical firm, recently announced it would
outsource one third of its NPD activities to India. These examples are not isolated incidents but
are reflective of a broader trend: a 2005 survey by AMR Research indicated that 41% of U.S.
manufacturers were considering outsourcing NPD in the near future (Industry Week 2006).
Despite the increased popularity of NPD outsourcing, many NPD outsourcing arrangements
are not delivering the expected benefits. While labor-cost savings are the primary rationale for
most firms to engage in outsourcing (Industry Week 2006), the ultimate cost savings associated
with outsourcing strategic activities may not be as substantial as they seem (Tadelis 2007). First,
the control costs to safeguard against potential opportunistic behavior by the outsourcing
provider are often overlooked or underestimated at the time outsourcing contracts are signed
(Williamson 2008). Second, firms may lose touch with new technological breakthroughs and
erode their potential for organizational learning when outsourcing strategic activities (Griffith,
Harmancioglu, and Droge 2009). Actively coordinating the resource and information flows with
the outsourcing provider may help guard against this loss of critical knowledge-based capabilities
but, in turn, will also increase the coordination costs of these arrangements. A recent Deloitte
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Consulting survey of the world’s largest organizations reports that nearly half of the firms
identified these “hidden costs” as a serious problem when managing outsourcing relationships
(Deloitte Consulting 2005, p. 17).
Against this background, a critical question is how firms can ‘design’ their NPD
outsourcing deals to alleviate control and coordination concerns, and reap the benefits of NPD
outsourcing. Numerous studies suggest that firms can use both formal and informal governance
mechanisms as control and coordination devices (e.g., Gulati and Singh 1998; Kumar and Seth
1998). An important formal governance mechanism is taking an equity stake in the outsourcing
provider (Kale and Puranam 2004). An important informal governance mechanism is selecting a
provider with whom the outsourcing firm shares a prior tie (Parkhe 1993).
We contribute to the literature in five ways. First, although the performance implications of
outsourcing peripheral functions have been studied in some detail (e.g., Poppo and Zenger 2002;
Tiwana 2008), there has been limited empirical research into the outsourcing of strategic
activities such as NPD.5 A key difference is that, while the outsourcing of both peripheral and
strategic activities is characterized by control concerns, the outsourcing of strategic activities is
set apart by coordination concerns resulting from the criticality of strategic activities to firm
performance (Griffith, Harmancioglu, and Droge 2009).
Second, much research to date has generated important insights into firms’ macro-
governance decisions, i.e. the choice among basic governance forms such as outsourcing versus
vertical integration (Boerner and Macher 2002). In contrast, relatively little is known about
micro-governance decisions – such as governance decisions within the outsourcing governance
form. We contribute to the latter stream of research by studying how a firm should govern its
NPD outsourcing relationship, given that it has decided to outsource.
Third, despite an extensive body of research on the controlling and coordinating functions
of formal and informal governance mechanisms, we understand little about when one mechanism
is superior to the other. We theorize and test that the effectiveness of equity participation and
prior tie selection in an NPD outsourcing arrangement depends on the external and internal
uncertainties the outsourcing firm has to cope with. In particular, we argue that external and
internal uncertainty create different types of control and coordination problems and that an equity
5 A notable exception is Carson (2007), who shows that contractual specifications are one type of governance




stake and prior tie selection differ in their ability to resolve these problems.
Fourth, we offer a richer perspective on the debate on substitutability versus
complementarity of formal and informal governance mechanisms (e.g., Dyer and Singh 1998;
Poppo and Zenger 2002). Instead of advocating that formal and informal governance are
substitutes or that they are complements, we propose that whether they serve as substitutes or
complements is also contingent on the type of uncertainty faced.
Finally, we link NPD outsourcing to a financial metric of performance that is highly
relevant to managers today: the stock market reaction around the outsourcing announcement date
(Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009). This is a forward-looking measure that reflects investors’
consensus forecast of the change in the long-term value of the firm attributable to the event
(Gielens et al. 2008).
We structure the remainder of this study as follows: In §3.2, we first outline our theoretical
framework, from which we derive a series of hypotheses on the effectiveness of the two
governance mechanisms under two types of uncertainty (§3.3). Next, in §3.4, we describe the
event study methodology we use to test these hypotheses empirically. We end with a discussion
of our results in §3.5, and implications for marketing theory and practice in §3.6.
§3.2 Conceptual Framework
We take the perspective of the outsourcing firm – the firm that transfers an NPD activity to an
external party. Extant research on outsourcing has identified the type of activity being outsourced
as a key explanatory factor determining outsourcing success, the general view being that
outsourcing strategic activities, such as NPD, is detrimental to performance (e.g., Gilley and
Rasheed 2000). However, outsourcing NPD need not always be performance-diminishing as long
as the related control and coordination concerns are handled well. Control concerns (sometimes
also referred to as appropriation concerns) pertain to the need for the outsourcing firm to protect
itself against potential opportunistic behavior by the outsourcing provider (Gulati and Singh
1998; Williamson 2008), such as provider attempts to appropriate tacit knowledge or to shirk
from responsibilities. Coordination concerns pertain to the need for the outsourcing firm to
coordinate resource and information flows with the outsourcing provider (Gulati and Singh
1998). Interfirm relationships are of the utmost importance for knowledge access and knowledge
transfer, but such tasks that cross organizational boundaries create coordination costs (Lorenzoni
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and Lipparini 1999). Coordination concerns are particularly important in an NPD environment,
since flexible access to external resources opens up new directions for innovation (Rowley,
Behrens, and Krackhardt 2000), while the transfer of knowledge from the outsourcing provider to
the outsourcing firm may guard against a loss of critical knowledge-based capabilities due to
outsourcing (Kalaignanam, Shankar, and Varadarajan 2007).
The Controlling and Coordinating Role of Formal and Informal Governance Mechanisms
Formal as well as informal governance mechanisms can address both control and coordination
concerns. From the perspective of transaction cost analysis, formal and informal governance
mechanisms function as controlling devices that safeguard against opportunism and
misappropriation. From the perspective of the resource-based view, formal and informal
governance mechanisms function as coordinating devices. The central mechanism in formal
governance to address these concerns is authority (Ouchi and Bolton 1988; Powell 1990), which
provides the outsourcing firm with oversight and influence (Puranam and Vanneste 2009).
Informal governance mechanisms find their origin in social norms (Macneil 1978). These norms,
which result from repeated exchanges embedded in social relationships, increase the partner’s
behavioral predictability (Puranam and Vanneste 2009) and create expectations of continuity that
prompt cooperation in the present (Poppo and Zenger 2002).
In an outsourcing context, an important formal governance mechanism is to take a minority
equity position in the outsourcing provider.6 Minority equity participation may provide firm-level
control, when the outsourcing firm gains a seat on the board of directors, or project-level control,
through the creation of oversight committees that periodically meet to monitor the progress of the
NPD activity being outsourced (Robinson and Stuart 2007). In addition, minority equity
participation may facilitate coordination of knowledge flows from and to the outsourcing firm,
for example through board-level interactions (Gulati and Singh 1998) or by “creating dedicated
integration managers or permanent liaison committees” (Kale and Puranam 2004, p. 83).
An important informal governance mechanism is the selection of a provider with whom the
6 It is important to note that the effect of equity participation is not a smooth linear effect (Kale and Puranam 2004).
Thus, the decision on equity participation is primarily a categorical (minority equity stake vs. majority equity stake
vs. equity joint venture) rather than a continuous one (Pan 1996). Following Carson (2007), NPD outsourcing
arrangements in this study do not include equity joint ventures nor do we include arrangements where the
outsourcing firm takes a majority equity position in the outsourcing provider. Since equity joint ventures involve the
creation of new entities, they are more like hierarchies (Gulati and Singh 1998). Majority equity stakes convert an
external partner into a legal subsidiary which reflects a step from hybrid to hierarchy (Ahmadjian and Lincoln 2001).
This is also borne out by our data, where none of the outsourcing announcements that we retrieved mentioned joint
ventures or majority equity stakes.
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outsourcing firm shares a prior tie (Parkhe 1993). Prior tie selection may solve control concerns
because the possibility of breaking off relations serves as a self-enforcing mechanism that
reduces opportunistic tendencies. Moreover, the social norms and the experience-based
knowledge that result from a prior tie reduce the unpredictable character of both partners’
behavior, which in turn enhances social identification and reduces opportunistic behavior (Dyer
and Singh 1998; Puranam and Vanneste 2009). In addition, as firms enter into successive
collaborative agreements with each other, they develop knowledge-sharing routines, which may
facilitate the coordination of knowledge flows (Gulati, Lavie, and Singh 2009).
Formal and Informal Governance Mechanisms: Unresolved Issues
Although decades of research on formal and informal governance mechanisms has established
their controlling and coordinating roles, several unresolved issues remain. First, we know little
about when one governance mechanism is more effective than the other. We argue that these
governance mechanisms have different effects on performance depending on the level of
uncertainty present. A distinctive characteristic of interfirm relationships is that partners have to
deal not only with the external uncertainty in their environment but also with the internal
uncertainty arising from each other’s behavior (Krishnan, Martin, and Noorderhaven 2006). We
build on this distinction between external and internal uncertainty in developing our hypotheses.
Specifically, we argue that external and internal uncertainty pose different types of control and
coordination problems and that formal versus informal governance mechanisms differ in their
ability to resolve these problems.
Second, the different sources of formal and informal governance – authority versus social
norms – have triggered a debate among academic scholars, with some arguing that they are
complements and others arguing that they are substitutes. Poppo and Zenger (2002) argue that the
unique origins of formal and informal governance mechanisms are indicative of their
complementarity. According to this view, the combination of formal and informal governance
mechanisms may deliver greater performance than either governance mechanism in isolation
(Luo 2002). The continuity encouraged by informal governance may help safeguard against
hazards poorly protected by the formal governance mechanism, while formal constraints can
narrow the severity of risk to which an exchange is exposed and thereby promote the
effectiveness of social norms (Poppo and Zenger 2002). However, their unique origins may also
bear a risk. Formal governance mechanisms may undermine informal mechanisms by signaling
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that the partner is not trusted to behave appropriately (Puranam and Vanneste 2009; Wuyts and
Geyskens 2005). As a consequence, it becomes more difficult to manage the relationship on the
basis of social norms (Ghoshal and Moran 1996; Jap and Ganesan 2000). An alternative
perspective is therefore that formal governance serves as a substitute for informal governance
(e.g., Dyer and Singh 1998; Lyons and Mehta 1997). Empirical evidence has been mixed.
These conflicting views and findings indicate a need for more research. We offer a richer
perspective to the substitutes-complements debate that may help reconcile the divergent
perspectives in the literature. Much of the discussion on substitutes versus complements ignores
the possibility that, because of their fundamentally different origins, the effectiveness of formal
and informal governance mechanisms – and when they are complements versus substitutes – may
differ depending on contextual factors.
§3.3 Hypotheses
We examine how minority equity participation and prior tie selection have different effects on the
outsourcing firm’s performance depending on the type of uncertainty present. External
uncertainty results from changes in the economic conditions faced by a firm that are outside its
control and hard to predict. In the context of NPD outsourcing, an important form of external
uncertainty is technological uncertainty (Griffith, Harmancioglu, and Droge 2009), the
uncertainty arising from changes in technology due to new inventions or discoveries. Internal
uncertainty pertains to the ambiguity in understanding and evaluating the actions of the
outsourcing provider. In an international setting, “a particularly potent form of internal
uncertainty is created by socio-cultural distance” (Anderson and Gatignon 1986, p. 17). We
develop our predictions based on the argument that technological uncertainty and cultural
distance present different control and coordination problems and that minority equity
participation and prior tie selection differ in their ability to resolve these problems. Table 3.1
summarizes the different control and coordination problems created by technological uncertainty
and cultural distance. We will use Table 3.1 as a basis for developing our hypotheses.
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Table 3.1: Control and Coordination Concerns under Technological Uncertainty and
Cultural Distance
Technological Uncertainty Cultural Distance
Control concerns Opportunistic renegotiationdue to incomplete contracts
Opportunistic
miscommunication that is
hard to detect because of
information asymmetry
Coordination concerns




that make knowledge transfer
difficult
Dealing With Technological Uncertainty When Outsourcing NPD
We define technological uncertainty as uncertainty arising from changes in technology due to
new inventions or discoveries (Sutcliffe and Zaheer 1998). Such changes, which are outside the
firm’s control, increase the difficulty to accurately forecast future technical requirements.
Technological uncertainty creates control as well as coordination problems. On the control side,
contracts in technologically turbulent environments are inevitably incomplete (Fee, Hadlock, and
Thomas 2006; Kale and Puranam 2004). The outsourcing provider may use the changing
circumstances to force renegotiation and improve the terms of trade at the outsourcing firm’s
expense. On the coordination side, gaining access to the right technologies while remaining
strategically flexible is difficult but critical to sustain a competitive advantage in a
technologically uncertain environment (Kale and Puranam 2004).
Minority equity participation and technological uncertainty. The control problems due to
incomplete contracts that are created by technological uncertainty can be addressed by minority
equity participation (Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas 2006; Ouchi and Bolton 1988). By taking a
minority equity stake, the outsourcing firm obtains some say over decisions concerning
unexpected contingencies that have not been set in the contractual agreement (Pisano 1989), and
the possibility of opportunistic renegotiation is correspondingly lower (Kale and Puranam 2004).
On the coordination side, technological uncertainty makes it difficult for the outsourcing
firm to flexibly access new technologies. When a firm does not know which technology is needed
for success because of technological uncertainty, it needs to remain flexible (Folta and Miller
2002). At the same time, when the technology in question is potentially critical to its business
goals,  the firm may want  to  prevent  rivals  from gaining access  to  it  (Kale  and Punaram 2004).
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Minority equity participation can provide this balance. By taking a minority equity position in the
outsourcing provider, “the sourcing firm [obtains] a certain degree of [… ] exclusivity over the
technology” (Kale and Puranam 2004, p. 90). Even at low levels of equity participation, the
outsourcing firm’s direct rivals are unlikely to create outsourcing relationships with the same
provider, as the outsourcing firm may use its minority equity position to further its own interests
at their expense (Kale and Puranam 2004). It also gives the outsourcing firm enough flexibility to
move quickly to a majority equity stake after the uncertainty is resolved (Folta and Miller 2002;
Inkpen and Ramaswamy 2006). This “option” becomes more valuable as uncertainty about the
technology increases (Kale and Puranam 2004). We therefore hypothesize:
H1 In technologically more uncertain environments, minority equity participation leads to
more favorable performance consequences of outsourcing NPD.
Prior tie selection and technological uncertainty. From a control perspective, the literature
is divided as to whether prior tie selection is able to solve the incomplete contracting problem
associated with technological uncertainty. On the one hand, social norms have been found to
foster continuity of the relationship and mutually agreeable outcomes in the face of renegotiations
due to highly consequential disturbances, such as high levels of technological change (Poppo and
Zenger 2002). On the other hand, the shared history between the outsourcing firm and its
provider may reduce the provider’s incentives to put much thought in the development project
beyond previous ideas and insights (Baiman and Rajan 2002). This lack of motivation may cause
the outsourcing provider to opportunistically evade necessary adaptations, by responding
inappropriately or not at all to technological uncertainty (Krishnan, Martin, and Noorderhaven
2006; Wathne and Heide 2000; Wuyts and Geyskens 2005). In sum, the literature is inconclusive
as to the effectiveness of prior tie selection in alleviating the control problems associated with
technological uncertainty.
The coordination concerns evoked by technological uncertainty relate to obtaining access to
valuable technological resources while remaining flexible. An important concern of working with
a familiar as opposed to a new provider in a technologically uncertain environment is that a
familiar provider is less likely to be able to  come  up  with  creative  and  novel  NPD  solutions
(Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpandé 1992). It has long been argued that for accessing creative
and novel ideas, firms may want to look not only beyond the boundaries of their firm but also
beyond their existing partners (Heide and Weiss 1995). In a recent study, Wuyts, Verhoef, and
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Prins (2009) find that customer firms in information service markets prefer not to work with prior
partners for services where creativity is key. They attribute this finding to cognitive biases
associated with working with known partners (selective perception, confirmation bias): their
panel discussion with 70 industry experts underscores that prior partners are less able to provide
surprising, novel solutions. This reduced creativity of the outsourcing provider and the reduced
novelty of its knowledge resources are a hindrance to deal with technological change.
Taken together, whereas there is debate as to whether prior tie selection alleviates the
control concerns associated with technological uncertainty, prior partners are less able to provide
access to creative, novel solutions in the face of technological uncertainty, which increases
coordination concerns. We hypothesize:
H2 In technologically more uncertain environments, prior tie selection leads to less favorable
performance consequences of outsourcing NPD.
Dealing With Cultural Distance When Outsourcing NPD
The difference between the cultural characteristics of the outsourcing firm’s country of origin and
the country where the outsourcing provider is located is known as cultural distance (Kogut and
Singh 1988). Coping with cultural distance has been recognized as complicated and costly, yet
very important to outsourcing success (Deloitte Consulting 2005). Cultural distance creates
behavioral uncertainty – equivocality in understanding and evaluating the actions of the
outsourcing provider. Specifically, in a culturally distant environment the companies may be “too
far apart in their ways of doing things to understand each other and connect to each other
effectively” (Doz 1996, p. 66). This may lead to two adverse consequences, as summarized in
Table 3.1. First, on the control side, the fact that cultural distance creates information asymmetry
may lead the outsourcing provider to opportunistically miscommunicate to the outsourcing firm,
behavior that is not easily detected (Wathne and Heide 2000). Second, on the coordination side,
cultural differences can also cause misunderstandings that are honest rather than deceitful, which
may hamper knowledge transfer between both firms (Simonin 1999).
Minority equity participation and cultural distance. We argue that minority equity
participation cannot solve the control and coordination problems that occur when cultural
distance is high. On the control side, equity participation is ineffective when the source of the
opportunism problem is related to information asymmetry. In such a case, opportunism is hard to
observe (Wathne and Heide 2000), making it difficult to use authority as a mechanism to control
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the counterparty’s behavior.
As to the coordination side, cultural differences may lead to misunderstandings, which turn
into key obstacles to interfirm knowledge transfer (Simonin 1999). According to Hamel (1991),
knowledge transfer is a process that consists of two critical steps: (1) disclosure of knowledge by
the outsourcing provider, and (2) assimilation of knowledge by the outsourcing firm. Although a
minority equity stake induces the outsourcing provider to disclose information to the outsourcing
firm (Chan et al. 2004; Pisano 1989), it does not improve the assimilation of this information by
the outsourcing firm when cultural distance is high. For assimilation to take place, the
misunderstandings that are caused by cultural differences and that hinder mutual understanding,
must be resolved. Prior research has shown that the mutual understanding required for
assimilating external knowledge should be achieved at the lower echelons of the firms (e.g.,
engineers or scientists), where daily interaction takes place (Inkpen and Dinur 1998). Interaction
that is stimulated by equity participation, however, typically occurs at high strategic levels, such
as directory boards and management committees (Gulati and Singh 1998; Kale and Puranam
2004). This is also reflected in Moorman’s (1995) observation that hierarchical formal structures
“are less likely to develop the person-to-person systems crucial to information processes” (p.
322). In sum, given the lingering control and coordination concerns in the face of cultural
distance, a minority equity investment is likely to render low returns and hence is not justified. In
line with these arguments, we hypothesize:
H3 When the outsourcing provider is culturally more distant, minority equity participation
leads to less favorable performance consequences of outsourcing NPD.
Prior tie selection and cultural distance. Cultural distance creates control concerns due to
information asymmetry, which enables the outsourcing provider to act opportunistically without
easily being detected (Wathne and Heide 2000). Prior tie selection reduces the risk of deceitful
communication in case of cultural distance. By sharing a prior tie, the outsourcing firm and its
provider have tacitly developed an understanding of norms about appropriate behavior (Doz
1996; Dyer and Singh 1998), which reduces opportunistic tendencies. In contrast, when there is
no history of prior ties between the outsourcing firm and its provider, each of the two firms may
project onto the other a set of interpretations borrowed from its own cultural context, often
incorrect, resulting in higher information asymmetry and more control problems (Doz 1996).
Thus, prior tie selection decreases the likelihood of deceitful communication by the outsourcing
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provider, which should help alleviate control concerns.
The coordination problem created by cultural distance pertains to ‘honest’ (undeceitful)
misunderstandings that make knowledge transfer difficult. Differences in organizational routines
between culturally distant companies complicate information sharing and learning. As partners
learn through a prior tie how their differences may be overcome, or even constructively
combined, knowledge sharing and learning become more efficient (Gulati, Lavie, and Singh
2009). Repeated interaction with the same firm establishes modes of communication (Zollo,
Reuer, and Singh 2002) and creates a common language for discussion (Hoetker and Mellewigt
2009). We thus hypothesize:
H4 When the outsourcing provider is culturally more distant, prior tie selection leads to more
favorable performance consequences of outsourcing NPD.
Taken together, H1-H4 propose that under technological uncertainty, minority equity
participation is performance-enhancing (H1) while prior tie selection is performance-diminishing
(H2). Under cultural distance, prior tie selection is performance-enhancing (H4), but minority
equity participation is performance-diminishing (H3). The question we address next is if the
performance-diminishing effects identified in H2 and H3 can be reduced by deploying the two
governance mechanisms in combination.
The Simultaneous Use of Minority Equity Participation and Prior Tie Selection
H2 proposed that in technologically more uncertain environments, prior tie selection leads to less
favorable performance consequences of outsourcing NPD. This proposition is based on two
rationales, a control rationale (the outsourcing provider is less motivated to deliver creative
solutions, which opposes the more traditional view that prior ties foster continuity when
renegotiations are in order) and a coordination rationale (the outsourcing provider is less able to
deliver creative solutions because of the lower novelty of its knowledge resources). Can minority
equity participation solve the performance-diminishing effect of prior tie selection under
technological uncertainty? If H2 is due to a control problem, supplementing prior tie selection
with a minority equity stake should be an effective solution because equity participation
facilitates the monitoring of progress (Robinson and Stuart 2007). The authority structure of
equity participation may thus serve as an incentive for the outsourcing provider to take up its
responsibility (Lyons and Mehta 1997). In contrast, if H2 is due to the coordination problem that
the provider is less able to come up with creative solutions, a minority equity participation is
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unlikely to be effective. In the latter case, minority equity participation represents an option on
inferior resources, an investment that may further decrease performance. These contrasting
rationales lead to two contrasting hypotheses: if the control rationale holds, equity participation
should alleviate the problem of prior tie selection under technological uncertainty (H5a); if the
coordination rationale holds, equity participation should worsen the problem (H5b). By testing
the joint effect of minority equity participation and prior tie selection under technological
uncertainty, we will be able to unravel whether H2 is largely due to control or to coordination
concerns.
H5a The relationship between prior tie selection and outsourcing performance under
technological uncertainty is less negative when the outsourcing firm takes a minority
equity stake in its provider.
H5b The relationship between prior tie selection and outsourcing performance under
technological uncertainty is more negative when the outsourcing firm takes a minority
equity stake in its provider.
H3 proposed that when the outsourcing provider is culturally more distant, minority equity
participation leads to less favorable performance consequences of outsourcing NPD. Again, this
proposition is based on two rationales: a control rationale (concealed opportunistic
miscommunication due to information asymmetry is difficult to address by authority-based
mechanisms) and a coordination rationale (minority equity participation shifts communication to
higher organizational echelons, but does not solve the lower-echelon cultural misunderstandings
that hamper information transfer). Can prior tie selection solve the performance-diminishing
effect of minority equity participation under cultural distance? Prior tie selection increases
behavioral predictability and helps build social identification (Dyer and Singh 1998; Puranam
and Vanneste 2009). These benefits of prior tie selection may reduce the information asymmetry
that jeopardizes the effectiveness of minority equity participation. Since prior tie selection also
creates a common language for discussion (Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009) and increases mutual
understanding (Dyer and Singh 1998; Gulati and Singh 1998), it further complements a minority
equity stake in addressing coordination concerns. We therefore hypothesize:
H6 The relationship between minority equity participation and outsourcing performance




Our performance metric is shareholder value. We examine the effect of outsourcing NPD on
shareholder value, using the event study methodology. A company’s stock price reflects the
discounted value of all future cash flows that are expected to accrue to the firm. According to the
semi-strong version of the efficient market hypothesis, all publicly available information about a
firm is reflected completely in its stock price. When new information becomes available,
investors update their expectations and react immediately by buying or selling stock, thereby
bidding the stock price up or down. Hence, if investors expect that NPD outsourcing will impact
firm performance by increasing (decreasing) future cash flows, they react to the announcement
by buying (selling) stocks, which positively (negatively) affects the firm’s stock price.
Marketing scientists have increasingly recognized the importance of stock price reactions
as a metric of firm performance. Stock price reactions are not only of interest because they guide
the decisions of top managers, they also allow for an inference of cause and effect in a quasi-
experimental setting (Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009). Specifically, the event-study approach
allows us to isolate individual outsourcing events – for which different governance mechanisms
and different outsourcing provider locations may have been chosen – and study their impact on
stock prices, while the effects of other events that may have affected stock prices are randomized
(since the NPD outsourcing events are announced on different dates). In contrast to accounting
measures which evaluate “historical” performance indicators, the stock-market reaction is
forward-looking; it reflects the stock market’s best estimate of the change in the long-term value
of the firm (Gielens et al. 2008). This is especially important in our context since the loss of
critical knowledge and skills (that may result from not coordinating the NPD outsourcing
arrangement properly) may take several years before fully translating into bottom-line
performance.
The percentage change in the stock price of firm i between day t-1 and day t is the daily
stock return Rit. Rit reflects investors’ expectations of the performance impact of the information
that became available between t-1 and t. The event study methodology compares the observed
stock return Rit on the event day to E(Rit), the return that would be expected if the event had not
taken place. To estimate E(Rit), we use the market model. According to this model:
mtiiit RRE βα
)) +=)( (1)
where Rmt is the market index return in the home country of the outsourcing firm on day t. iα
) and
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iβ̂  are firm-specific OLS estimates from regressing Rit on Rmt over an estimation period
preceding the event. In our setting, the estimation period covers [t-250, t-30], i.e. 250 to 30
trading days prior to the event. The difference between Rit and E(Rit) is a measure of the abnormal
return ARit  for firm i at day t:
mtiiitititit RRRERAR βα
)) −−=−= )( (2)
ARit provides an unbiased estimate of the future earnings generated by the event.
Thus far, we considered the situation that there is no information leakage prior to the event
day and that all information is completely disseminated during the event day. In practice, these
assumptions may be violated (Gielens et al. 2008). To account for leakage (for t1 time periods
before the event) and dissemination over time (for t2 time periods after the event), firm i’s
abnormal returns over the event period [-t1, t2] are aggregated into a cumulative abnormal return










Because the event study is conducted over N events, this CAR can be averaged into a cumulative
average abnormal return (CAAR):








The extent of information leakage and dissemination, and thus the length of the event window
[-t1, t2] is an empirical issue and is determined by selecting the most significant cumulative
average abnormal return from several calculated CAARs for different event windows (cf.
Swaminathan and Moorman 2009). To test the significance of the CAAR, we use the Patell (1976)
statistic as described in Gielens et al. (2008).
We test our hypotheses on the performance differences between outsourcing firms through
a regression analysis on the (standardized) cumulative abnormal returns:7
7 The standardized CARi are used as dependent variable to reduce heteroskedasticity problems that might arise when
the estimated variances of the market model residuals vary across events (see Geyskens, Gielens, and Dekimpe 2002
or Gielens et al. 2008 for similar practice). The standardized CARi is the CARi divided by the standard deviation of
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where EqParti is minority equity participation, Tiei refers to prior tie selection, TechUnci is
technological uncertainty, and CulDisi refers to cultural distance. We also controlled for potential
confounds. Specifically, we include LabCosti, Sizei, and Profiti to control for labor-cost
differences (the primary rationale for most firms to engage in outsourcing), the outsourcing
firm’s size, and the outsourcing firm’s profitability (financial information that may influence
stock returns; cf. Luo 2007).8 We use mean-centering prior to forming the interactions to ease
interpretation. To control for unobserved heterogeneity between countries, industries, and
calendar years, we add dummy variables for each country, industry, and announcement year to
equation (5), but in the interest of brevity we do not report them in the model or the tables. Since
our number of observations is too low to include all dummy variables in our final analysis, we
tested each dummy separately and retained only the significant ones.
Sample
We constructed a data set of NPD outsourcing announcements by searching the Lexis Nexis,
SDC Platinum, and Factiva databases over a period of 15 years (1994-2008). This resulted in an
initial sample of 159 announcements. We removed 36 announcements because the outsourcing
firm was not listed on the stock market and 7 announcements because stock price information
was missing around the event day. In 16 cases, the announcement included information about
other firm events (e.g., firm sales, earnings) or another announcement concerning the firm
appeared within the three-day window around the announcement. We removed these 16
announcements to minimize the presence of confounding effects.
This resulted in a sample of 100 announcements that unequivocally reflect NPD
outsourcing. The outsourcing firms in our sample span 15 different countries and 17 industries.
The majority of announcements were made by outsourcing firms coming from the United States
(55%), followed by Japanese (7%) and Canadian (6%) firms. The outsourcing providers come
from a wide variety of countries, including Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Finland, France,
8 We also did create a variable to capture the legal atmosphere of the outsourcing provider’s country (i.e. rule-of-
law), but because of the high correlation between rule-of-law and labor cost savings (r = .95), we could not include
both variables in our final model.
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Germany, Hungary, India, Italy, the Netherlands, South Africa, Taiwan, the U.K., and the U.S.
Measurement and Descriptives
Information on stock prices and market-wide indices is collected from the CRSP and Datastream
databases. These data are used to calculate the daily returns of firm i, Rit, and the market returns,
Rmt, respectively. A summary description of all measures for the independent and control
variables, including the diverse data sources used, can be found in Table 3.2. Table 3.3 provides
the descriptive statistics and correlations for our variables. While most of the correlations are
rather low, bivariate measures of association do not reveal higher-order contingency effects such
as those hypothesized in our study.
§3.5 Results
Effect of Outsourcing NPD on Shareholder Value
On the announcement day, outsourcing firms experience on average a .20% increase in stock
returns. Of all windows surrounding the event day, the one from -1 to +1 shows the most
significant CAAR: CAAR[–1,+1] = .45% (p < .05), corresponding to an increase in market value
of almost $629.07 million in three days for an average-sized firm in our sample.
Factors Explaining Performance Differences Between Outsourcing Firms
There is considerable variation in the performance implications of NPD outsourcing across firms.
While 54% of the outsourcing firms show a positive abnormal return over the event window
(average CAAR = 3.20%), 46% are evaluated negatively by investors (average CAAR =
-2.79%). To understand this cross-sectional variation, we estimated equation (5) with the
individual firms’CAR[–1, +1] as dependent variable. Since firms may choose governance
mechanisms in response to the uncertainty they are facing, we first tested for potential
endogeneity of equity participation and prior tie selection.9 A Durbin-Wu-Hausman test indicated
that both governance mechanism variables are exogenous ( 2(2) = 3.28, p = .19). Interestingly,
9 To ensure identification, we needed to include independent variables (instruments) in the equations for minority
equity participation and prior tie selection. We find meaningful instrumentation by using the outsourcing firm’s
R&D intensity and intellectual property rights protection in the country of the outsourcing provider as identifying
instruments for equity participation (F(2,100) = 6.79; p < .05). The first is indicative of exploration, a distinctive
characteristic of firms that take options on external technologies through minority equity stakes; the second
facilitates appropriating value from NPD investments, thus stimulating equity investments. We use firm age as an
identifying instrument for prior tie selection, since older firms are more likely than younger firms to have
accumulated a network of prior partners from which they can choose  ( 2(1) = 3.08; p <  .10).  Since  we  have  two
instruments for equity participation, we conducted an overidentification test (Hansen’s J test); the null hypothesis





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































neither technological uncertainty nor cultural distance significantly affected minority equity
participation (p’s > .40) and prior tie selection (p’s > .50). Thus, OLS estimation is more
appropriate than IV estimation, because it is unbiased and consistent, while IV estimation leads to
a loss of efficiency.
Table 3.4 presents the results.10 As hypothesized, minority equity participation leads to
more favorable performance consequences of outsourcing NPD in technologically more uncertain
environments (H1: b5 = 128.80, p < .01). In sharp contrast, prior tie selection negatively affects
performance in case of higher technological uncertainty (H2:  b6 = -29.18, p < .05). When the
outsourcing provider is culturally more distant, minority equity participation leads to less
favorable performance consequences of outsourcing NPD (H3: b7 = -1.13, p < .05), whereas prior
tie selection becomes more effective (H4: b8 = .54, p < .10).






Minority equity participation (EqPart) .98 1.67
Prior tie selection (Tie) -.07 -.20
Uncertainty
Technological uncertainty (TechUnc) -5.33 -.72
Cultural distance (CulDis) -.21 -.88
Interaction effects
EqPart * TechUnc + 128.80*** 3.40
Tie * TechUnc - -29.18** -2.01
EqPart * CulDis - -1.13** -2.19
Tie * CulDis + .54* 1.63
EqPart * Tie -.17 -.19
EqPart * Tie * TechUnc +/- -154.93*** -3.07
EqPart * Tie * CulDis + 2.71*** 2.59
Control variablesb
Labor cost savings .02 .89
Firm size -.11 -1.21
Profitability .28 1.37
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01
a We use one-sided tests for hypothesized effects, two-sided tests for non-hypothesized  effects.
b For simplicity of presentation, the results for the country, industry and year dummies are  not reported in the
table.
10 All variance inflation factors are below 4 (largest VIF = 3.37), suggesting that multicollinearity is not a concern.
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Can minority equity participation solve the performance-diminishing effect of prior tie
selection under technological uncertainty? The negative three-way interaction effect (b10 =
-154.93, p < .01) implies that the answer is no. This finding suggests that the performance-
diminishing effect of prior tie selection under technological uncertainty is caused by a
coordination problem rather than a control problem, thereby providing support for H5b over H5a.
Can prior tie selection solve the performance-diminishing effect of minority equity participation
under cultural distance? The positive three-way interaction effect (b11 = 2.71, p < .01) suggests
that the answer is yes. This finding supports H6.
To get an intuitive feel for the interaction effects, we plotted the partial derivatives of
equation (5) using Schoonhoven’s (1981) procedure (see Wathne and Heide 2004 for similar
practice). Panel A1 of Figure 3.5 shows how the effect of minority equity participation on
outsourcing performance increases as technological uncertainty increases. Panel A2 of Figure 3.5
shows how the positive effect of prior tie selection on outsourcing performance weakens and
even becomes negative when technological uncertainty increases. Similarly, the simultaneous use
of prior tie selection and minority equity participation (panel A3) is performance-diminishing
across most of the range of technological uncertainty.
Panel B of Figure 3.5 portrays the effects for cultural distance. As is evident from Panel B1, at a
low (high) level of cultural distance, minority equity participation is positively (negatively)
related to the performance consequences of outsourcing NPD. The effect of prior tie selection
turns positive in sign at low levels of cultural distance, and becomes stronger as cultural distance
increases (panel B2). Finally, the simultaneous use of minority equity participation and prior tie
selection is positively related to the performance consequences of outsourcing NPD when
cultural distance increases from low to high (panel B3).
Robustness Checks
We checked whether the initial positive stock market evaluation was not just a short-run rise that
was corrected in the longer-run (Fama 1998). We calculated 3 months, 6 months, and 1 year
long-term effects using the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and Ibbotson’s returns across
time and securities (IRATS) models. We found no effect on long-term abnormal returns (p’s >
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outsourcing accrue in the short-term window and there are no corrections in the long-run.11
Our dependent measure is the difference between the actual return and the estimated
expected return based on the market-return model. To assess the robustness of our findings to the
type of model used to estimate the expected returns, we re-estimated the abnormal returns using
the world-market model, which adjusts abnormal returns not only for domestic market
movements, but also for global market movements and changes in foreign currency exchange
rates (Park 2004). In addition, we examined the effects of removing potential outliers (±5th, 10th,
and 15th percentile of residuals). Our results are robust to these alternative specifications.
§3.6 Discussion
As companies have grown more comfortable with outsourcing, they are increasingly outsourcing
strategic business functions that until recently had not been outsourced, such as NPD. Our finding
that NPD outsourcing has, on average, positive performance implications explains this rush
towards outsourcing. However, although the average return to NPD outsourcing may well be
positive, it would be incorrect to conclude that all NPD outsourcing arrangements are smart
business actions. The average return conceals much variation. In fact, the stock market evaluates
46% of the NPD outsourcing arrangements negatively.
Our results show that this variation in stock market evaluations can be explained by the
governance mechanism(s) used – minority equity participation and/or prior tie selection – to deal
with two types of uncertainty – technological uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty induced by
cultural distance. We find that no single governance mechanism is always superior. Instead,
minority equity participation and prior tie selection can be double-edged swords, with a
performance-enhancing potential that increases under certain conditions but decreases under
others. As visualized in Figure 3.5, minority equity participation is performance-enhancing under
high technological uncertainty, but performance-diminishing under high cultural distance. Prior
tie selection is performance-enhancing under high cultural distance, but performance-diminishing
under high technological uncertainty. We explain these differential effects through the different
11 Our dependent variable is the short-term cumulative abnormal return accruing from the NPD outsourcing
announcement to the outsourcing firm. It should be noted that, although this measure materializes in the short term
(consistent with the efficient market hypothesis that a firm’s stock price immediately reflects all new information),
conceptually this measure reflects the stock markets’best estimate of the change in the long-term value of the firm.
Significant long-term abnormal returns, as computed by the BHAR or IRATS methodology, reflect that the stock




control and coordination problems that are created by technological uncertainty and cultural
distance.
Technological uncertainty can cause overt, opportunistic renegotiations as a result of
incomplete contracts. An outsourcing firm can hedge against such observable opportunism by
means of a formal, authority-based control mechanism such as equity participation. In addition,
equity participation enables the firm to flexibly access external technologies and as such not only
serves a control but also a coordination function. While the literature is inconclusive with regard
to the effectiveness of prior tie selection to hedge against observable opportunism caused by
incomplete contracts, it seems to converge in that prior tie selection reduces rather than increases
access to valuable external technologies. In the extant marketing literature, several authors have
pointed to problems associated with long-term relationships, such as decreased creativity and
novelty (Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpandé 1992; Wuyts, Verhoef, and Prins 2009). Using
secondary data, we corroborate these survey-based findings and show that the stock market
punishes a firm for outsourcing NPD to a provider with whom it shares a prior tie when
technological uncertainty is high. Prior tie selection restricts the ‘freshness’ of the solutions
offered by the outsourcing provider, which is worrisome when firms should be responding
creatively to technological change. An open question was: is this performance-diminishing effect
caused by the provider’s lack of motivation or lack of ability to offer creative solutions? The
significant and negative three-way interaction effect between prior tie selection, technological
uncertainty, and equity participation provides the answer: the performance-diminishing effect of
prior tie selection under high technological uncertainty is mainly caused by a prior outsourcing
provider’s reduced ability to be creative, rather than to a lack of motivation.
Cultural distance leads to information asymmetry – which may create control problems –,
and to (honest) misunderstandings – which creates coordination problems. The control problem
posed by cultural distance relates to the possibility that the outsourcing provider will deliberately
provide wrong information given that such opportunistic miscommunication is hard to detect
when cultural distance is high. Because of the unobservable nature of this type of opportunism
(Wathne and Heide 2000), an informal governance mechanism that is based on norms of good
conduct, such as prior tie selection, is a better hedge than an authority-based mechanism such as
minority equity participation. The coordination problem posed by cultural distance relates to the
difficulty of transferring knowledge between the parties. Prior tie selection helps create a
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common language that may alleviate this coordination problem. Equity participation, however,
stimulates communication at high strategic levels, whereas the mutual understanding required for
assimilating external knowledge should be achieved at the lower echelons of the involved firms.
Consistent with the arguments that the ineffectiveness of equity participation under high cultural
distance is explained by the unobservable nature of opportunism and the lack of a common
language, we find that prior tie selection is complementary to equity participation when dealing
with high cultural distance.
Combined, these findings contribute to the discussion in the literature on the substitutability
or complementarity of formal and informal governance mechanisms. The question implicitly
asked by former studies is “Are formal and informal governance mechanisms either substitutes or
complements?” when the correct question is: “Under which conditions are formal and informal
governance substitutes versus complements?”
An interesting observation that stems from our endogeneity analyses is that the selection of
governance mechanisms is not influenced by the degree of technological uncertainty and cultural
distance. Hence, firms do not behave optimally. This observation contributes to the debate
whether theories of governance choice are good predictors of managerial behavior. We attribute
the gap between managerial practice and managerial prescriptions in our study to the recency of
the NPD-outsourcing phenomenon. Since firms have little or no own prior experiences to rely on,
they are still uncertain about the benefits and drawbacks of outsourcing NPD (Deloitte
Consulting 2005). Our findings may serve as a warning as they question the proposition that
descriptive research always has normative implications, an article of faith among neoclassical
economists.
Implications for Practice
The rush towards outsourcing is often ascribed to labor-cost savings. But for the firms in our
sample, labor-cost savings did not affect outsourcing performance.12 Rather, control and
coordination concerns – and the way these were handled – affected the performance
consequences of NPD outsourcing. Our model can help managers cope with these concerns. In
order to illustrate the consequences of alternative decisions, we calculate predicted CARs for
different governance decisions (equity participation vs. prior tie selection vs. both vs. neither)
12 One possible explanation is that differences in labor-costs for the outsourced activities may not be as substantial as
the differences in labor-costs averaged across industries (we only had access to the latter).
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under low and high levels of technological uncertainty and low and high levels of cultural
distance, where low and high levels are represented by one standard deviation below and above
the mean (in the case of cultural distance, the low level corresponds to ‘no cultural distance’, i.e.
when NPD is outsourced to a domestic partner). Figure 3.6 reports the predicted CARs and can be
used as a decision matrix for firms when outsourcing NPD.









































When technological uncertainty is low, prior tie selection is the better governance
mechanism when there is no cultural distance (CAR = .21%) or when cultural distance is high
(CAR = .94%). In contrast, minority equity participation is performance-diminishing under these
circumstances (CAR = -.77% when there is no cultural distance and CAR = -3.65% when cultural
distance is high). Interestingly, the combined use of prior tie selection and minority equity
participation is by far the most attractive strategy when NPD is outsourced to a culturally distant
provider in technologically predictable environments (CAR = 4.14%). Put differently, when
technological uncertainty is low, outsourcing to culturally distant countries under the protective
wings of prior tie selection and minority equity participation is to be preferred over selecting a
domestic outsourcing provider.
When the outsourcing firm faces a technologically turbulent environment, it can increase its
CAR from -.11% to 5.11% by taking a minority equity participation in a domestic outsourcing
provider. If this same firm would offshore to a culturally distant provider, its CAR would reduce
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from 5.11% to 2.23%, a 56% drop. Thus, when technological uncertainty is high, selecting a
domestic outsourcing provider is preferable to outsourcing to culturally distant providers. Prior
tie selection, on the other hand, should be avoided at all times when technological uncertainty is
high, since CARs become as low as -.71% (when cultural distance is high) and -1.43% (when
there is no cultural distance). The positive performance effect of taking an equity stake in a
domestic partner even turns into a strong negative effect when a domestic partner is selected with
whom the outsourcing firm has worked before (CAR = -2.87%).
Limitations and Future Research Directions
This study has several limitations, some of which provide interesting avenues for future research.
First, we were unable to control for characteristics of the outsourcing providers, such as
reputation or firm size, because the outsourcing providers were often located in countries where
firm-specific information is poorly documented. Future research could consider survey research
to address this issue. Second, although we searched for NPD outsourcing announcements in three
different databases (covering over 100 newspapers, business, and trade magazines) to increase
the likelihood of obtaining a more representative data set, we may have failed to uncover
announcements from companies that do not report in the public records covered by these
databases. In addition, our study dealt with stock market reactions to announcements of NPD
decisions, and not with the actual implementation of these decisions. Announcements are
intended strategies that may be modified during implementation. It would be helpful for future
research to study the effectiveness of strategy implementation. Third, since our study is based on
secondary data, we were unable to test or control for other types of informal governance in the
absence of prior ties. Even though other types of informal governance such as trust-based and
routines-based governance often result from a history of prior ties (Gulati and Singh 1998; Zollo,
Reuer, and Singh 2002), further research may explore the differential effectiveness of alternative
informal governance mechanisms. Fourth, while the focus of this study was on outsourcing an
activity that was previously performed within the boundaries of the outsourcing firm, a relatively
new phenomenon is backsourcing: bringing an outsourced activity back in-house (Tadelis 2007).
Backsourcing is costly: a company has to reorganize twice (first transitioning to outsourcing, then
transitioning to insourcing), employee morale may be shaken, and customers may become
dissatisfied. What are the factors that drive firms to backsource? Also, when is it better to
reorganize outsourcing arrangements instead of to backsource? Finally, future studies could focus
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on what drives the performance of the outsourcing provider. While some providers are
flourishing, many are languishing. Further research could try to explain this variation, thereby
complementing our findings on the performance consequences for the outsourcing firm.
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Chapter 4
Does Outsourcing Manufacturing Enhance or Erode Firm Innovativeness?
§4.1 Introduction
Over the last 10 years, outsourcing has become the norm rather than the exception (Hätönen and
Eriksson 2009). Especially manufacturing has already gone a long way down the road of
outsourcing (The Economist 2004). Manufacturing outsourcing, which can be defined as “the
reliance on external sources for manufacturing components” (Lei and Hitt 1995, p. 836), was first
adopted in the 1960s en 70s and developed into a huge trend in later years. Whereas in 1990, less
than 5 percent of all manufacturing was outsourced (Delattre, Hess, and Chieh 2003), 15 years
later, in 2005, manufacturing has become an area that is 70 to 80 percent outsourced (Corbett
2005).
While there is considerable consensus in the literature that outsourcing the manufacturing
function may help firms in cutting costs (Gilley and Rasheed 2000; The Outsourcing Institute
1998), there is an ongoing debate about the effect of outsourcing manufacturing on innovation.
On the one hand, the outsourcing of manufacturing is sometimes referred to as “the new way of
driving innovation” (Taplin 2008). Advocates of this point of view argue that outsourcing
manufacturing stimulates innovation as it enables firms to move away from production efficiency
as the primary objective and to learn from partners (Bengtsson, Haartman, and Dabhilkar 2009;
Quinn 2000). On the other hand, others argue that manufacturing outsourcing inhibits innovation.
According to this alternative point of view, manufacturing outsourcing leads to the loss of an
important learning process, i.e. learning-by-doing (Kotabe 1998; Kotabe, Mol, and Murray 2008).
The purpose of this paper is to empirically explore the question under which conditions
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manufacturing outsourcing stimulates versus inhibits innovation.
We contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we are among the first to study the effect
of outsourcing manufacturing on firm product innovation. Although innovation is vitally
important for firms to survive competition (Hauser, Tellis, and Griffin 2006) and to spur growth
(Sorescu and Spanjol 2008), there is surprisingly little research on this relationship. In contrast to
prior research that has primarily focused on the cost-efficiency implications of manufacturing
outsourcing (e.g., Jiang, Frazier, and Prater 2006), we will study the effect of outsourcing
manufacturing on firm innovation.
Second, we aim to provide more insight into the relationship between outsourcing
manufacturing and innovation by developing a contingency framework. We identify variables
that moderate the effect of outsourcing manufacturing on innovation and thus specify conditions
under which outsourcing manufacturing may either inhibit or stimulate innovation. In particular,
we expect that the implications of outsourcing manufacturing on innovation vary depending on
demand volatility within the firm’s industry and the availability of alternative sources of learning
that may foster firm innovation.
We test our conceptual framework on a time-series cross-sectional dataset containing 1,505
observations for 109 firms in the consumer packaged goods (CPG) industry. The sampled firms
introduced 18,271 new products during the sample period (1985-2008). The results show, among
others, that when the outsourcing firm operates in a market that requires fast and frequent
learning (as is the case when demand volatility is high), outsourcing manufacturing will reduce
firm innovation. In contrast, firms that are R&D intensive can benefit from outsourcing
manufacturing.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first outline our conceptual
framework in §4.2 and develop our hypotheses in §4.3. Next, we describe our methodology in
§4.4 and present our results in §4.5. Finally, §4.6, we discuss the implications of our findings.
§4.2 Conceptual Framework
Firms must continuously develop and introduce new products to the marketplace to secure a
position in today’s highly competitive market environment (Rothaermel, Hitt, and Jobe 2006). A
substantial body of research deals with the question of how the organizational form of firms
affects their innovative capabilities (Belenzon and Berkovitz 2010). While there is broad
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consensus about the positive effect of different organizational forms, such as joint ventures and
internal corporate ventures, on innovation (Zajac, Golden, and Shortell 1991), there is an ongoing
debate about the relationship between outsourcing and innovation (Bengtsson and Dabhilkar
2009). Whereas some argue that outsourcing manufacturing inhibits innovation, others contend
that outsourcing manufacturing stimulates innovation.
Outsourcing Manufacturing: Inhibitor or Stimulus of Innovation?
On the one hand, some researchers have argued that there is a negative relationship between
outsourcing manufacturing and innovation. The underlying reason is that outsourcing
manufacturing creates a barrier for learning (Kotabe, Mol, and Murray 2008), and learning is key
to the success of innovations. More specifically, when firms outsource manufacturing, the
process of learning-by-doing will be lost. It is the outsourcing provider that performs the
manufacturing activities and through manufacturing develops knowledge, which makes learning,
and thus innovation, more difficult for the outsourcing firm (Kotabe, Mol, and Murray 2008).
On the other hand, others have suggested that innovation can be separated from
manufacturing (e.g., Sturgeon 1997). From this perspective, outsourcing manufacturing creates a
change in the firm’s culture, from a culture that puts production efficiency and cost minimization
central (which is the primary objective of manufacturing; see Song, Montoya-Weiss, and Schmidt
1997) to a culture that supports innovation. In addition, outsourcing manufacturing may stimulate
innovation, because it enables firms to learn from their partners (Bengtsson, Haartman, and
Dabhilkar 2009).
Towards A Contingency Framework
Because prior research is equivocal about the consequences of manufacturing outsourcing, we
develop a contingency model. We examine how outsourcing manufacturing is related to firm
innovativeness and identify variables that moderate this relationship. More specifically, we argue
that the effect of outsourcing manufacturing on innovation varies depending on (1) demand
volatility in the firm’s industry and (2) the firm’s alternative sources of learning,  as  shown  in
Figure 4.1. First, when faced with frequent and unexpected changes in demand, firms need to
make instantaneous changes to their products (Zhou 2006). From the lessons learned from
executing these instantaneous changes, they can develop a strategy as they go along (Moorman
and Miner 1998; Weick 1979). Second, although learning-by-doing is an important learning
process of firms (Kotabe, Mol, and Murray 2008), another internal learning process available to
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firms is learning-by-searching, which is related to firm activities aimed at determinedly
generating new knowledge (Malerba 1992). Given our focus on innovation, we consider R&D
and marketing as important activities the firm can use to generate new knowledge through
learning-by-searching (Song, Montoya-Weiss, and Schmidt 1997).
Figure 4.1: Conceptual Framework
§4.3 Hypotheses
The Moderating Role of Demand Volatility
Demand volatility can be defined as the unpredictability of (future) demand (Gatignon and
Robertson 1989). Demand volatility increases the difficulty of understanding customer markets
(Baum and Wally 2003) and enhances the need for continuous learning (Hagedoorn and Duysters
2002). In highly volatile markets, customer needs and preferences are unstable and changing
rapidly (Zhou, Yim, and Tse 2005). Since the success of the firm is highly dependent upon the
ability to innovate in response to these rapidly changing customer needs and preferences, firms
have to identify and meet these needs by modifying their products accordingly (Cui, Griffith, and
Cavusgil 2005; Menon, Jaworski, and Kohli 1997). In an unpredictable environment, such
adaptations need to be implemented nearly instantaneously rather than after the careful and
meticulous development of a plan of action (Moorman and Miner 1998; Weick 1979). Through
direct involvement in manufacturing, firms are continuously able to recognize new product
possibilities that may be relevant to specific product markets (through learning-by-doing) and to
exploit these possibilities through immediate adaptations in the manufacturing process (Cohen
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and Levinthal 1990).
Alternatively, in a predictable environment marked by stable customer needs and
preferences, the ability to learn-by-doing and to make instantaneous adaptations to the production
of new products is less critical. Careful planning can precede the execution of plans, yielding
time for interfirm coordination and the communication of required product adaptations in the
manufacturing process. As a result, outsourcing is a more viable alternative in case of low
demand volatility. We therefore hypothesize:
H1 The relationship between outsourcing manufacturing intensity and firm innovation is
negatively influenced by demand volatility.
The Moderating Role of Alternative Sources of Learning
When outsourcing the manufacturing function, the firm loses the possibility to learn-by-doing.
This loss can be compensated through learning-by-searching. What is more, the strategic
emphasis that results from outsourcing manufacturing in combination with investing in R&D
and/or marketing contributes to the development of an organizational culture oriented toward
creation rather than optimization. As a consequence, firm innovation is fostered. In particular,
R&D investments can be considered as an important input to create new information (Cohen and
Levinthal 1989), and consequently help firms to develop know-how that is essential for
innovation success (Mol 2005). In a similar vein, marketing expenditures are related to creativity,
reflected in innovative output of the firm. Firms that invest in marketing create knowledge about
current and future needs and preferences of consumers (Kor and Mahoney 2005) and are thus
better able to identify new market opportunities, which may lead to successful innovations
(Calantone, di Benedetto, and Divine 1993). In contrast, firms that maintain many of the
manufacturing processes in-house tend to emphasize optimization more heavily than creation,
since manufacturing is focused on optimal production planning and process-efficiency
improvements. This line of reasoning is consistent with the assertion of Wierenga and van
Bruggen (1997) that the value attached to certain activities (and the associated firm culture)
influences the firm’s approach to solving problems (in particular, optimizing versus creating
problem-solving-modes, see Wierenga and van Bruggen 1997, p. 27).
In addition, outsourcing manufacturing can stimulate the learning functions of R&D and
marketing. Through an emphasis on learning-by-searching, firms are able to build up their
absorptive capacity. As Cohen and Levinthal (1989) argue, R&D investments enhance a firm’s
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ability to identify, assimilate, and exploit externally available knowledge. Moreover, although the
concept of absorptive capacity typically relates to R&D intensity, Lane, Koka, and Pathak (2006)
argue that it can be applied to other types of business-related knowledge as well, including
marketing expertise. Firms that invest in marketing are not only likely to increase their
knowledge about current and future needs and preferences of consumers, but also to enhance
their ability to evaluate new ideas coming from outsourcing providers (Weigelt and Sarkar 2009).
In sum, because outsourcing manufacturing will shift a firm’s focus from efficiency (the
primary objective of manufacturing) to knowledge generation (the primary objective of R&D and
marketing), and since R&D and marketing-intensive firms learn from their partners by means of
absorptive capacity, the following is hypothesized:
H2 The relationship between outsourcing manufacturing intensity and firm innovation is
positively influenced by R&D intensity.
H3 The relationship between outsourcing manufacturing intensity and firm innovation is
positively influenced by marketing intensity.
§4.4 Methodology
Empirical Setting
The empirical setting of our study is the consumer packaged goods (CPG) industry. This setting
is chosen for several reasons. First, the industry is economically important. It is a multi-trillion
industry that contributes an estimated US$2.1 trillion of revenues to the overall U.S. economy
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2006) and is responsible for approximately US$3.4 trillion in business
worldwide (Barbier et al. 2007). Second, CPG firms are outsourcing manufacturing at an
increasing rate (George 2007). Finally, partly due to the economic recession, companies in this
industry are faced with the challenge to develop new and innovative products to increase
revenues (Barbier et al. 2007; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2010). This makes our research question
– under which conditions does manufacturing outsourcing stimulate versus inhibit innovation –
particularly important in the context of the CPG industry.
Sample
We assembled a time-series cross-sectional database by aligning data from two major sources,
namely Compustat and Product Launch Analytics. While Compustat provides us with firm-level
data as well as market information, Product Launch Analytics is our source of information for
Does Outsourcing Manufacturing Enhance or Erode Firm Innovativeness?
67
new product introductions. It is the most comprehensive database of newly launched CPGs,
reporting detailed descriptions of over half a million new products from worldwide markets
introduced from 1980-present.
We first selected from Compustat all firms whose primary NAICS codes are covered by
Product Launch Analytics. Using the Compustat company names, we subsequently searched for
all new product introductions by these firms in Product Launch Analytics. This procedure
resulted in a final sample of 109 firms for which at least ten years of data are available between
1985 and 2008. During this period, the sampled firms introduced 18,271 new products. The firms
span 34 different industries within the CPG context.
Operationalization
Firm innovation. We construct annual measures of firm-level innovation, by summing the
number of innovations each firm introduced each year during the 1985-2008 period.13
Outsourcing intensity. We measure outsourcing intensity by dividing worth of purchases
(i.e. inputs outsourced to suppliers) by firm revenue (Strassmann 2004). Firms that purchase
more inputs from external parties perform less manufacturing themselves, and therefore have a
higher outsourcing intensity. Because firms may decide to outsource with the objective to
become more innovative, we encounter a possible endogeneity problem. Consequently, we
replace outsourcing intensity with an instrument. Following Dhar and Hoch (1997), we first
regress the current values of outsourcing intensity on the one-year lags and then replace the
original values with the predicted values. Through this procedure, we lose the first year of data
for each firm.
Demand volatility. Following previous research (Fang, Palmatier, and Steenkamp 2008;
Krishnan, Martin, and Noorderhaven 2006), demand volatility is operationalized by regressing
industry sales against time. Subsequently, the standard error of the regression slope coefficient of
the time variable is divided by the mean value of industry sales. The measure of demand
volatility is based on the five years preceding the focal year.
R&D and marketing intensity. R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of R&D expenses to
total assets of the organization (Bhagat and Bolton 2008; Kor and Mahoney 2005). Marketing
intensity is measured as the annual Selling, General and Administrative (SG&A) expenditures
13 We re-estimated our model using the log-transformation of this measure. Since the logarithm of zero is undefined,
we added 1 to all the data points before taking the logarithm. Results remain substantively the same.
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divided by total assets (Kor and Mahoney 2005). Although the SG&A measure also contains
items that are not strictly marketing expenses, it is the best publicly available measure of
marketing spending (see Dinner, Mizik, and Lehmann 2009 and Dutta, Narasimhan, and Rajiv
1999 for similar practice).
Control variables. We control for firm size, fixed asset intensity, and resource slack (cf.
Sorescu and Spanjol 2008). Firm size is included, because large firms are expected to introduce
more innovations. We measure firm size as the log-transformation of total sales (Kotabe,
Srinivasan, and Aulakh 2002). Fixed asset intensity reflects the level of assets which are not
easily converted into liquid assets. The higher the level of fixed asset intensity, the fewer
resources are available for innovation, and the less likely it is that firms launch new products.
Fixed asset intensity is measured as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets (Sorescu and Spanjol
2008). Resource slack refers to the presence of excess resources that the firm can use without
constraining existing, ongoing activities. Thus, the higher the level of resource slack, the more
resources firms can devote to innovation. Resource slack is measured as retained earnings
divided by total assets (Fang, Palmatier, and Steenkamp 2008).
We lag all independent variables by one year to capture their effects on new product
introduction in the following year.14 Table 4.2 provides a summary description of our measures.
Model
We investigate the impact of outsourcing manufacturing on firm innovation by estimating a
random-intercept negative binomial regression model. We use a negative binomial regression
model because the dependent variable, firm innovation, is a nonnegative count variable.15
Because our data consist of a set of individual firms over time, observations in the model are
likely to be dependent. Therefore, we use a random-intercept model.
The negative binomial regression is a generalization of a Poisson regression model that
accounts for an overdispersed dependent variable by including a stochastic component into the
conditional mean (Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Rahman 2009; Hausman, Hall, and Griliches 1984):
14 We re-estimated our model using two-year lags instead of one-year lags for our independent variables. Results
remain substantively the same.
15 Note that Poisson models are also appropriate for estimating count models. However, we find evidence of
overdispersion ( 2(1) = 549.46, p < .01). Overdispersion may cause standard errors of the estimates to be
underestimated in Poisson models (Cameron and Trivedi 1986). Therefore, we use negative binomial regression.
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Table 4.2: Variables and Data Sources
Construct Measure Data Source
Firm innovation Number of innovations the firm
introduced in the focal year
- Product Launch
Analytics
Outsourcing intensity Ratio of worth of purchases to revenues,
where worth of purchases equals firm’s
value added minus revenues
- Compustat
Demand volatility Industry sales are regressed on year
(based on 5 years prior to the focal
year), and the standard error of the
regression slope coefficient is divided
by the mean of industry sales
- Compustat
R&D intensity Ratio of R&D expenditures to total
assets
- Compustat
Marketing intensity Ratio of SG&A expenditures to total
assets
- Compustat
Firm size Natural logarithm of total sales - Compustat
Fixed asset intensity Ratio of fixed assets to total assets - Compustat
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where yit is the number of innovations introduced by firm i at time t, Xi,t-1 is the vector of
explanatory variables, and µit represents the conditional mean. To account for the panel structure










































where OutInti,t-1 is outsourcing intensity, DemVoli,t-1 refers to demand volatility, RDInti,t-1 and
MktInti,t-1 are R&D and marketing intensity, respectively, FSizei,t-1 is firm size, FAInti,t-1 refers to
fixed asset intensity, ResSlki,t-1 is resource slack, i is the random effect for firm i and it is  the






The firms in our sample show considerable variability in the amount of outsourcing and the
number of product introductions. While some firms outsource only 14% (minimum; e.g.,
Finsbury Food Group), the majority of firms outsource more than 50%, with a maximum of 99%
(e.g., Albert Fisher Group). With regard to firm innovation, the number of products introduced by
firms per year varies from 0 (e.g., Duvel Moortgat) to 395 (e.g., Beiersdorf), with an average of
more than 11 new product introductions per firm per year.16 Table 4.3 reports descriptive
statistics.
Empirical Results
Table 4.4 presents our results. To test whether multicollinearity is a concern, we calculate the
variance inflation factor (VIF). The highest VIF value is 1.75, so multicollinearity is unlikely to
be a problem (Judge et al. 1988).
H1 proposes that demand volatility will negatively influence the relationship between outsourcing
manufacturing and firm innovation. This hypothesis is supported (H1:  b3 = -26.80, p < .01). H2
and  H3 pertain to the moderating role of the firm’s alternative sources of learning on the
relationship between outsourcing manufacturing and firm innovation. Consistent with our second
hypothesis, we find that R&D intensity has a positive moderating effect on the relationship
between outsourcing manufacturing and firm innovation (H2: b5 = 125.81, p < .01). In contrast,
the effect of marketing intensity is not significant (H3:  b7 = 2.86, p > .10). Therefore, H3 is
rejected.
 To get more insight into our interaction results, we use simple slope analysis (see e.g.,
Ramanathan and Dhar 2010 for similar practice). We plot the effects in Figure 4.5 for low (i.e.
one standard deviation below the mean) and high (i.e. one standard deviation above the mean)
values of both demand volatility and R&D intensity, and varying levels of outsourcing intensity.
A low level of outsourcing intensity corresponds to approximately twenty percent of outsourced
manufacturing, whereas high levels of outsourcing correspond to almost eighty percent of the
manufacturing function being outsourced.
16 Given the large variation in innovativeness across firms, we assessed the robustness of our findings by removing
the least (10th percentile) and most (90th percentile) innovative firms from our sample. We found the results to be
substantively the same to those of the overall sample.

















































































































































































































































Outsourcing ratio +/- -.34 -.72
Industry
Demand volatility -3.35 -2.88***
Demand volatility x Outsourcing ratio - -26.80 -2.60***
Alternative sources of learning
R&D intensity 9.94 1.81*
R&D intensity x Outsourcing ratio + 125.81 2.85***
Marketing intensity 1.52 4.56***
Marketing intensity x Outsourcing ratio + 2.86 .89
Control variables
Firm size .44 11.98***
Fixed asset intensity -.42 -1.31*
Resource slack .62 2.77***
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10
a We use one-sided tests for hypothesized effects and two-sided tests for non-hypothesized effects.
As we show in Panel A of Figure 4.5, when demand volatility is low, outsourcing manufacturing
does not affect innovation (simple slope: b = .62, p > .10). In contrast, outsourcing manufacturing
negatively affects innovation when demand volatility is high (simple slope: b = -1.44, p < .05).
Panel B of Figure 4.5 shows the interaction effect of outsourcing manufacturing and R&D
intensity. When R&D intensity is low, outsourcing manufacturing negatively impacts innovation
(simple slope: b = -.85, p < .05). When R&D intensity is high, outsourcing manufacturing
positively affects innovation (simple slope: b = .94, p < .10).
As to our control variables, we find that larger firms and firms that have a high level of
resource slack generate more innovative output (b8 = .44, p < .01 for firm size and b10 = .62, p <
.01 for resource slack). Fixed asset intensity negatively affects innovation (b9 = -.42, p < .10).
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Figure 4.5: Interaction Effects
Panel A. The Contingent Effect of Demand Volatility
Panel B. The Contingent Effect of R&D Intensity
§4.6 Discussion
This paper highlights an important, but unresolved issue within the context of outsourcing
manufacturing, i.e. does outsourcing manufacturing inhibit or stimulate innovation? Despite the
fact that firms have outsourced part of their manufacturing function for more than two decades,
the impact of outsourcing manufacturing on innovation is still unclear. The literature that deals
with this question is inconclusive and presents arguments for both positive (e.g., Bengtsson,











































Mol, and Murray 2008). Our focus is on the conditions that moderate the relationship between
outsourcing manufacturing and firm innovation.
Implications for Theory
We show that the relationship between outsourcing manufacturing and innovative output is
complex and depends on demand volatility in the firm’s industry and the availability of
alternative sources of learning for the firm. In particular, our research shows that manufacturing
outsourcing can be either an inhibitor or a stimulus of innovation, depending on demand volatility
and the firm’s R&D intensity. When demand volatility is high, learning-by-doing is more crucial
because of the limited time to plan carefully before executing adaptations in the manufacturing
process. In this case, outsourcing manufacturing becomes an inhibitor of innovation. On the
contrary, outsourcing manufacturing serves as a stimulus of innovation for R&D intensive firms.
The combination of intensive outsourcing of manufacturing and high investments in R&D signals
a strategic emphasis on innovation, which is more likely to stimulate creativity than optimization
as problem-solving mode. In addition, R&D intensive firms are better able to learn from their
outsourcing providers, which may further enhance firm innovation.
Our results add to the ongoing debate about the importance of the manufacturing function.
With  the  rise  of  the  knowledge  economy  and  a  more  dominant  service  sector,  many  firms  are
underestimating the importance of manufacturing. As Ramaswamy and Rowthorn (2000, p. 32)
state “Does manufacturing matter? The short answer is: not much.” On the contrary, others have
argued that outsourcing manufacturing leads to the hollowing out of firms, which may have
caused the competitive decline of many Western firms (Bettis, Bradley, and Hamel 1992; Pisano
and Shih 2009). Our results show that outsourcing manufacturing may reduce innovation under
certain circumstances (i.e. high demand volatility), but increase innovation under other
circumstances (i.e. high R&D intensity). Thus, it is not a question of whether manufacturing is
important, but rather a question of when manufacturing is important.
Managerial Implications
Many firms are attracted to outsourcing manufacturing because of the cost reductions that can be
attained, and thus adopt a short-term perspective (Momme and Hvolby 2002). However, as our
results indicate, the implications of outsourcing manufacturing are beyond cost reductions alone.
Firms should take a more strategic perspective and take into account the effects of outsourcing on
innovation. Indeed, once firms have started to outsource manufacturing, it may be difficult to
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reverse this decision if it turns out to inhibit innovation, because of the permanent loss of
knowledge and the substantial costs inherent to backsourcing (Whitten, Chakrabarty, and
Wakefield 2010).
In addition, the trend of outsourcing manufacturing is accompanied by such techniques as
lean manufacturing and Six Sigma (Klier 1994). Lean manufacturing mainly focuses on the
trade-off between cost, quality, and efficiency. Six Sigma is a tool often associated with lean
manufacturing and focuses on quality improvement (Arnheiter and Maleyeff 2005). In support of
lean manufacturing principles, firms outsource their manufacturing function in the conviction that
it will increase firm performance. However, Anderson (2004) already noted that it is hard for
outsourcing firms to achieve high quality levels by implementing Six Sigma, because of the lack
of control outsourcing firms have over their providers. We add to this finding by showing that
firm innovation also may suffer.
Limitations and Future Research
Our study has several limitations that provide directions for future research. First, we test our
conceptual framework in the CPG industry. Future research could test the relationship between
outsourcing manufacturing and firm innovation in other industries to increase the generalizability
of our findings. Second, our innovation metric (number of new product introductions) does not
allow us to distinguish the extent to which the newly introduced products provide meaningfully
unique benefits (Sethi, Smith, and Park 2001). Moreover, not all new product introductions will
be successful. Future research could extend our work by distinguishing successful from
unsuccessful, and incremental from radical, product innovations. Finally, as customers are
confronted with more and more choice, they are becoming increasingly demanding. Mass
customization, the mass production of individually customized products (Fiore, Lee, and Kunz
2004), is sometimes proposed as a suitable strategy to address the needs of these more demanding
customers. Mass customization requires that firms are knowledgeable about their ‘individual’
customer needs. When firms outsource their manufacturing function, they should assure that the
outsourcing provider collects the necessary customer information or that it transfers the required
information to the outsourcing provider. Neither of these options is straightforward. Future
research could therefore address the question whether and how outsourcing manufacturing can be
reconciled with the strategy of mass customization.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Research
Outsourcing has developed into a huge trend. Not only are more and more firms turning to
outsourcing, these firms are also outsourcing more and more different types of activities.
Consequently, the question is not so much whether to outsource, but, rather, how to outsource
successfully. This dissertation focuses on the performance implications of outsourcing and
examines conditions under which outsourcing may be a successful strategy. This chapter
discusses the main findings in §5.1, managerial and theoretical implications in §5.2, and
directions for further research in §5.3.
§5.1 Summary and Conclusions
What distinguishes successful from unsuccessful outsourcing practices? This dissertation
contains three chapters aimed at answering this question. In the following subsections, we
provide a separate conclusion per chapter.
Chapter 2 When Does Outsourcing Customer Support Affect Firm Value?
Although customer-support outsourcing is all the rage, many firms are unsuccessful. Results from
an event study indicate that, on average, the impact of outsourcing customer support on
shareholder value is positive. At the same time, the performance consequences of outsourcing
customer support differ substantially across firms. Whereas about half of the firms is evaluated
positively by investors, the other half is evaluated negatively.
Using transaction cost analysis, we hypothesize how the performance implications of
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outsourcing customer support are contingent upon the type of customer support that is being
outsourced, the institutional context surrounding the outsourcing relationship, and the
mechanisms that are used to govern the outsourcing arrangement. We find that outsourcing
customer support is more negative when the outsourced customer support activity involves
personal customer contact or when it requires specialized knowledge. The performance
implications of outsourcing customer support are unrelated to labor-cost savings. Outsourcing to
culturally distant countries is performance-diminishing, whereas outsourcing to countries with
more stringent business regulations is performance-enhancing. Finally, the performance
consequences of customer-support outsourcing are more favorable when firms use multisourcing
to govern the outsourcing relationship. The use of minority equity participation and prior tie
selection does not affect the performance implications of outsourcing customer support.
Chapter 3 The Market Valuation of Outsourcing New Product Development
As companies have grown comfortable with outsourcing, they have started to outsource strategic
business functions that until recently had not been outsourced, such as new product development
(NPD). An empirical test shows that the effect of outsourcing NPD on the outsourcing firm’s
shareholder value is, on average, positive. There is, however, considerable variation in the
performance implications of NPD outsourcing.
We develop a contingency framework to explain whether and when taking a minority
equity participation in the outsourcing provider versus selecting an outsourcing provider with
whom one shares a history of prior ties may increase the outsourcing firm’s performance. We
find that which governance mechanism is superior depends on two forms of uncertainty. A
minority equity participation enhances performance under technological uncertainty but not
under behavioral uncertainty created by cultural distance. In contrast, prior tie selection is
performance-enhancing under cultural distance, but exacerbates technological uncertainty
problems. In addition, we find that prior tie selection can solve the performance-diminishing
effect of minority equity participation under cultural distance, but minority equity participation
cannot solve the performance-diminishing effect of prior tie selection under technological
uncertainty. We explain these differential effects through the different control and coordination
problems that are created by technological uncertainty and cultural distance.
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Chapter 4 Does Outsourcing Manufacturing Enhance or Erode Firms’ Innovativeness?
Attracted by potential cost reductions, an increasing number of firms are outsourcing
manufacturing. However, it is still unclear what the performance implications of outsourcing
manufacturing are in terms of innovative output. Whereas some argue that outsourcing
manufacturing reduces firm innovation – because firms lose the process of learning-by-doing –
others argue that outsourcing manufacturing stimulates innovation -- because outsourcing
provokes a shift from an efficiency focus to an innovation focus and enables learning from
partners.
Using a contingency approach, we hypothesize that the effect of outsourcing manufacturing
on firm innovation depends on demand volatility, the outsourcing firm’s R&D intensity, and its
marketing intensity. We find that outsourcing manufacturing leads to less firm innovation when
demand volatility is high. In contrast, outsourcing manufacturing leads to more firm innovation
when the outsourcing firm invests more heavily in R&D. Marketing intensity does not affect the
relationship between outsourcing manufacturing and firm innovation.
§5.2 Implications
The findings of this dissertation help outsourcing firms to get more insight into the factors that
impact the performance consequences of outsourcing.
Managerial Implications When the Firm Outsources Customer Support
Chapter 2 concerns the impact of outsourcing customer support on the financial value of the firm.
Three major implications can be derived from the findings of this study, i.e. (1) know what to
outsource, (2) know where to outsource, and (3) know how to outsource.
Know what to outsource. Managers of the outsourcing firm should recognize that not all
customer support functions are the same. Contrary, customer support functions differ in several
respects, such as the personal nature of the contact (i.e. personal versus impersonal) and the
extent of specialized knowledge. In general, personal customer contact is more variable in nature,
is a more valuable source of market information, and influences customer evaluations more
strongly than impersonal customer contact. Consequently, when the customer support activity
requires personal customer contact the performance implications of outsourcing customer support
will be affected negatively. Customer-support activities requiring high levels of specialized
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knowledge are not good candidates for outsourcing either, as these activities need more
investments in training and education than customer-support activities requiring low levels of
specialized knowledge.
Know where to outsource. The findings of this study emphasize that the choice of
outsourcing customer support should not be based on labor-cost savings alone. Rather, the
cultural distance between the outsourcing firm and its provider and the regulatory system of the
outsourcing provider’s country should be taken into account. When the outsourcing provider is
culturally more distant, the outsourcing firm will be faced with a higher risk of opportunistic
behavior of the outsourcing provider. Moreover, cultural distance introduces communication
difficulties that further increase the costs of outsourcing customer support. In addition, when the
regulatory system of the outsourcing provider’s country is weak, it is likely that the costs of
outsourcing customer support will increase. Thus, outsourcing firms should not outsource to
countries that are culturally distant or have a weak regulatory system
Know how to outsource. To govern the outsourcing arrangement, outsourcing firms are
advised to use multisourcing. That is, outsourcing firms are better off by using multiple
outsourcing providers to perform the outsourced customer-support function. Although it is more
difficult and costly for the outsourcing firm to coordinate multiple outsourcing providers, these
costs can be more than offset by cost savings resulting from the lower dependence on a single
outsourcing provider and the increased competition among outsourcing providers that stimulates
best practice. In contrast, the use of dyadic governance mechanisms, i.e. minority equity
participation and prior tie selection, does not influence the performance implications of
outsourcing customer support.
Managerial Implications When the Firm Outsources New Product Development
Chapter 3 examines the financial performance consequences of outsourcing NPD and gives
managers some direction in terms of how to govern the outsourcing arrangement (i.e. minority
equity participation and/or prior tie selection) when they face technological uncertainty or a
culturally distant outsourcing provider.
Effective governance under technological uncertainty. When outsourcing firms are
operating in a technologically uncertain environment, a minority equity stake will be the most
effective governance mechanism, because it will help firms to deal with the control concerns
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(opportunistic renegotiation due to incomplete contracts) and the coordination concerns
(obtaining access to new technologies while remaining flexible) created by technological
uncertainty. In contrast, prior tie selection exacerbates the control and coordination problems
created by high technological uncertainty, and thus will lead to less favorable performance
consequences of outsourcing NPD. Moreover, these problems cannot be solved by
simultaneously taking a minority equity stake and selecting an outsourcing provider with whom
the outsourcing firm shares a relationship history. Such an outsourcing provider is less able to
come up with creative solutions and, as a consequence, a minority equity participation represents
an option on inferior resources. Indeed, the simultaneous use of these governance mechanisms
leads to even lower performance consequences.
Effective governance under cultural distance. When firms are outsourcing to culturally
distant outsourcing providers, they are advised to select outsourcing providers with whom they
share a prior tie. In this way, firms are able to deal with the control concerns (opportunistic
miscommunication that is hard to detect because of information asymmetry) and coordination
concerns (honest misunderstandings that make knowledge transfer difficult) created by cultural
distance. In contrast, a minority equity stake does not help to solve the control and coordination
problems created by cultural distance, and thus will not lead to more favorable performance
consequences of outsourcing NPD. Yet, when cultural distance is high, minority equity
participation and prior tie selection serve as complements (as opposed to the case of high
technological uncertainty where these governance mechanisms are not complementary). The
benefits of prior tie selection, i.e. higher levels of behavioral predictability and social
identification, a common language for discussion, and an increased mutual understanding,
complement a minority equity participation to address control and coordination concerns. Thus,
in the case of high cultural distance, outsourcing firms are able to create more favorable
performance consequences of outsourcing NPD by simultaneously using minority equity
participation and prior tie selection as governance mechanisms.
It is interesting to relate and compare a number of findings of chapters 2 and 3. First, we find that
both outsourcing customer support and outsourcing NPD are, on average, evaluated positively by
investors. These findings contradict the belief that firms should only outsource routine activities,
since outsourcing non-routine activities hollows out organizations (Quinn and Hilmer 1994;
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Rothery and Robertson 1995). A possible explanation could be that investors are increasingly
recognizing (1) the need for offering consumers 24/7 customer support and (2) the need for an
open innovation model. At the same time, both studies show that it is incorrect to conclude that
all customer-support outsourcing and NPD outsourcing arrangements are good business
decisions. Contrary, the logic is more intricate. As our results indicate, the performance
implications of outsourcing are contingent on various factors, such as for example environmental
conditions and the governance mechanisms employed by the outsourcing firm.
Second, the results show important differences with regard to the effects of different
governance mechanisms. In chapter two, we find that dyadic governance mechanisms (i.e.
minority equity participation and prior tie selection) are unrelated to the performance
implications of outsourcing customer support. In contrast, in chapter 3, we find that both dyadic
governance mechanisms are essential to deal with external and internal uncertainty. We argue
that these different findings across chapters 2 and 3 can be explained by (i) the difference in the
function being outsourced and (ii) the difference in the stakeholders that are involved. Minority
equity participation is more valuable in case of outsourcing NPD than in case of outsourcing
customer support. Whereas equity participation addresses control and coordination concerns
when firms are outsourcing NPD17, it mainly addresses control concerns when firms outsource
customer support activities. Recall that coordination concerns pertain to the need for the
outsourcing firm to coordinate resource and information flows with the outsourcing provider. In
an NPD environment, these resource and information flows pertain to critical knowledge-based
capabilities. Although the firm and its provider should also transfer information in the case of
outsourcing customer support, the knowledge being transferred is less critical and consequently
the coordination problems will be less pertinent. Thus, the cost of taking an equity stake is more
easily offset against the control and coordination advantages that equity participation creates in
the case of outsourcing NPD, but apparently is not offset by the control advantages that equity
participation brings in the case of outsourcing customer support.
As to prior tie selection, we argue that the different findings between chapter 2 (prior tie
selection is unrelated to the performance implications of outsourcing customer support) and
17 Especially the coordination concerns are important in the context of outsourcing NPD, as was evidenced by our
significant three-way interaction between minority equity participation, prior tie selection, and technological
uncertainty. This interaction helped us to determine whether the negative interaction between prior tie selection and
technological uncertainty is mainly due to a control or coordination problem. Indeed, as our results show, the effect
is driven by coordination concerns.
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chapter 3 (prior tie selection helps to address the control and coordination concerns caused by
external and internal uncertainty in case of outsourcing NPD) can be attributed to the different
stakeholders involved in the outsourcing process. Whereas prior tie selection facilitates
communication between the outsourcing firm and its provider, regardless of the function being
outsourced, it does not facilitate communication between the outsourcing provider and the end
users (customers) of the outsourcing firm. Consequently, when firms outsource customer support,
it could well be the case that these customers experience difficulties in communicating with the
outsourcing provider. Firms that outsource NPD will not encounter this problem, because their
end users/customers are not involved in the outsourcing process.
In addition, chapters 2 and 3 differ with regard to multisourcing. Whereas several firms that
outsource customer support select multiple outsourcing providers (12% of our sample), none of
the firms in our NPD sample used multisourcing. We attribute this difference to the complexity
of NPD outsourcing arrangements. In particular, knowledge transfer inherent to outsourcing NPD
may be a barrier for selecting multiple outsourcing providers.
Managerial Implications When the Firm Outsources Manufacturing
Chapter 4 focuses on the impact of outsourcing manufacturing on firm innovation. Managers can
learn from this chapter under which circumstances outsourcing their manufacturing activities
stimulates versus inhibits their innovativeness.
Learning-by-doing can be crucial. Firms should realize that learning-by-doing is important
in the context of high demand volatility. Outsourcing manufacturing will reduce the firms’ ability
to innovate under this condition. In essence, when demand volatility is high, firms need to be able
to make instantaneous changes to their products to meet changing customer needs and
preferences. Through direct involvement in manufacturing, firms are continuously able to
recognize new product possibilities that may be relevant to specific product markets (through
learning-by-doing) and to exploit these possibilities through immediate adaptations in the
manufacturing process.
Alternative sources of learning are important. When  firms  decide  to  outsource
manufacturing, they should invest in alternative learning processes, i.e. learning-by-searching, to
keep up their innovation level. Especially firms that invest more heavily in R&D can benefit from
outsourcing manufacturing. By outsourcing the manufacturing function, R&D intensive firms are
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likely to develop an organizational culture oriented toward the creation of new knowledge rather
than production efficiency and cost minimization. Additionally, these firms are able to learn from
their outsourcing providers by means of absorptive capacity.
Chapter 4 shows that innovation is an important performance metric to be taken into account
when outsourcing manufacturing. This result complements our findings from chapters 2 and 3
that outsourcing decisions should not be narrowed down to a mere labor-cost-savings decision.
As the results of chapters 2 and 3 show, labor-cost savings do not affect outsourcing
performance. Thus, while labor-cost savings are the primary reason for outsourcing (see Table
1.1), it does not affect the market valuation of outsourcing firms.
§5.3 Future Research Directions
This dissertation provides valuable insights with regard to the performance implications of
outsourcing. In this section, we identify a number of possible directions for future research. First,
we will discuss three different types of outsourcing that would benefit from more research, i.e.
multisourcing, crowdsourcing, and backsourcing. Subsequently, we will focus on future research
issues related to the outsourcing process, i.e. partner selection and outsourcing contracts. Finally,
the perspective of the outsourcing provider offers interesting future research opportunities.
Different Types of Outsourcing
Multisourcing. Until recently, it was common for firms to select a single outsourcing
provider that performed the outsourced activity. Nowadays, more and more firms are selecting
multiple outsourcing providers that carry out the same outsourced task (Levina and Su 2008;
Nagle and Maughan 2007/08), a phenomenon known as multisourcing (Cohen and Young 2006).
As discussed in chapter 2, firms should use multiple outsourcing providers when they
outsource their customer-support activities. Future research could complement these findings by
studying the management of multiple outsourcing providers. For instance, it is possible that one
outsourcing provider’s activities adversely affect the activities of another outsourcing provider.
Moreover, each outsourcing provider must be governed through the appropriate governance
mechanisms, which may differ across outsourcing providers. In addition, if firms divide
interrelated activities between multiple outsourcing providers, the management of outsourcing
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relationships becomes even more complicated. In this case, outsourcing providers are
interdependent and the outsourcing firm risks that inconsistencies arise between the performed
activities of each of the different outsourcing providers. Future research could take a network
perspective, and provide more insight into the division of tasks among several outsourcing
providers, the alignment of the different objectives of the outsourcing firm and its providers
through customized governance mechanisms, and the stimulation of cooperation between
outsourcing providers.
Crowdsourcing. Through the emergence of new internet applications, crowdsourcing has
arisen as a new form of outsourcing (Kleemann, Voß, and Rieder 2008). Crowdsourcing can be
defined as “the act of a company or institution taking a function once performed by employees
and outsourcing it to an undefined (and generally large) network of people in the form of an open
call” (Howe 2006). Firms are outsourcing different activities, such as new product development,
product design, and marketing campaigns to consumers. Today, large companies as Dell, Philips,
and Procter & Gamble are already making use of crowdsourcing.
Crowdsourcing is interesting for future research from the perspective of both the customer
and the outsourcing firm. From the customer point of view, one may wonder what customers’
motives are to come up with new ideas in exchange for a small or even no reward. Moreover, an
interesting question is whether crowdsourcing increases customer value. More specifically, does
crowdsourcing indeed lead to better products or services, as is expected by most managers? A
question that arises from the outsourcing firm’s perspective is, for instance, whether
crowdsourcing leads to better financial performance (e.g., profitability) and non-financial
performance (e.g., brand awareness). Additionally, it is of interest to examine how new media,
especially social media like Facebook and Twitter, can help outsourcing firms to take more
advantage of crowdsourcing.
Backsourcing. Backsourcing can be defined as “the action of bringing an outsourced
service or good back in-house” (Tadelis 2007, p. 265). Different organizations, including Dell,
AT&T, Capital One, and J.P. Morgan Chase, have decided to backsource some of their
outsourced activities (Li and Choi 2009). Future research could address what the main drivers of
backsourcing are. Are there external factors (e.g., underperformance outsourcing provider, end of
contract) that encourage outsourcing firms to backsource, or are there factors that are internal to
the outsourcing firm that drive backsourcing (e.g., unrealized cost savings, loss of control)? By
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analyzing what reasons outsourcing firms have to backsource, we may get a better understanding
of why so many outsourcing arrangements fail, and hence are able to complement our findings. A
related question is why firms opt for backsourcing rather than switching to a new outsourcing
provider (when, for example, the outsourcing provider is underperforming) or renew the contract
(in case the contract ends). Backsourcing is an expensive strategic turnaround. Firms not only
have to incur high expenses to rebuild the outsourced activity, but often are faced with high
termination fees as well (Wong, Rahman, and Jaya 2008). Moreover, by backsourcing firms
‘admit’  that  they  made  inappropriate  strategic  decisions  in  the  past,  which  may  have
consequences for the market valuation of the firm and its reputation. Future research could test
this.
The Outsourcing Process
Partner selection. A  crucial  step  in  the  outsourcing  process  is  the  selection  of  an
outsourcing provider. Partner selection can strongly influence later stages of the outsourcing
arrangement, including the effective management of the outsourcing relationship and the need for
governance (Dekker 2008). Because the outsourcing provider base is diverse and growing, the
challenge for outsourcing firms is to understand their own needs and identify outsourcing
providers whose capabilities and objectives are best aligned with these needs (Feeny, Lacity, and
Willcocks 2005). However, this is far from straightforward. In contrast to other interfirm
relationships, such as strategic alliances, where the objective is to establish and maintain a long-
term relationship to compete with other firms outside the relationship (Hitt et al. 2000),
outsourcing relationships are typically characterized by divergent objectives. In addition, the
partner selection process is largely based on perceptions of the outsourcing firm about the
capabilities of the outsourcing provider, introducing uncertainty in the selection process. The
outsourcing firm should overcome these challenges and determine specific selection criteria to
optimize the selection process. Future research could examine the overall relationship between
partner selection and the outsourcing firm’s performance and test which factors in the selection
process are critical for the success of the outsourcing relationship. A dynamic approach is called
for since selection criteria may change over time.
Outsourcing contracts. Future research could provide more insight into the contractual
issues between the outsourcing firm and its provider. For example, future research could code
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outsourcing contracts with regard to different terms, such as those associated with (i) product and
price, (ii) after-sales service, (iii) assignment of rights, and (iv) legal recourse. The first two types
of terms include provisions specifying the detailed terms of trade as well as product and service
performance specifications. The third category of terms includes provisions concerning
intellectual property, antipiracy measures, and nondisclosure. The last type of terms specifies
how the transacting parties will identify and resolve potential disputes (Anderson and Dekker
2005). It would be interesting to examine whether and how the presence or absence of different
contractual terms influences the outsourcing provider’s behavior, and how this in turn will
influence the outsourcing firm’s performance.
The Perspective of the Outsourcing Provider
The chapters in this dissertation take the perspective of the outsourcing firm.18 Research
conducted from the perspective of the outsourcing provider is scarce (see Heide and Weiss 1995
for an exception), but no less important. Since the outsourcing market is growing, the base of
outsourcing providers is becoming larger. A critical question for outsourcing providers is,
therefore, how they can obtain entry into the consideration set of the outsourcing firm and thus
increase their chances of being selected as an outsourcing provider. An analysis of which factors
outsourcing firms perceive as critical in compiling their consideration set, may help outsourcing
providers to formulate their (marketing) strategies to attract new outsourcing firms, but also to
retain current ones. Another avenue for further research is to examine how outsourcing providers
can maximize their performance. Too often, outsourcing providers are inclined to underprice to
win outsourcing contracts (Jiang, Yao, and Feng 2008), a strategy that is likely to lead to lower
performance. Moreover, along with the development that outsourcing contracts become smaller
in value and contract durations become shorter, outsourcing firms are gaining more power. In
particular, outsourcing providers face the threat of losing business. Future research could provide
insight into how outsourcing providers can hedge against this threat, and how this in turn may
influence the outsourcing provider’s performance.
18 Since outsourcing providers are often located in countries where firm-specific information is poorly documented
and because outsourcing firms are often reluctant to announce the outsourcing provider’s name, it was difficult to
obtain information on the outsourcing provider.
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§5.4 To Close
For some, outsourcing is the future. Others debunk the value of outsourcing and have negative
attitudes towards outsourcing. Whatever the debate is, nobody is able to get around the
outsourcing trend and it shows no signs of slowing down. This dissertation shows that
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